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I. Introduction 
Courts around the country enter pretrial confidentiality 
orders every day.1 Commentators and courts have long debated 
the impact of court confidentiality on public safety.2 This debate 
often centers on whether public harms flow from court orders 
that limit the audience for discovery information that those 
same courts order parties to produce.3 But an underexplored 
aspect of pretrial confidentiality is the cost it imposes on the 
litigation system. Confidentiality orders that prevent litigants 
in similar cases from sharing information make litigation less 
efficient and less effective.4 Courts are split on if, when, and how 
                                                                                                     
 1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(g) (allowing protective orders to limit access 
to trade secrets and other proprietary information); see also, e.g., Laurie Kratky 
Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use of Limits of Confidentiality in Pursuit of 
Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 (1999) (noting the frequent use of 
confidentiality in civil litigation). 
 2. Compare Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order 
Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6–9 (1983) (chronicling the intrusive nature of 
civil discovery and observing that parties have legitimate reasons to keep 
discovery information private), and Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order 
in Products Liability Litigation: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771, 
772–75 (1990) (contending that privacy interests should trump public and party 
interests broader dissemination of pretrial discovery), with Dore, supra note 1, 
at 296 (noting the view that courts are “publicly funded” and “accountable to 
and guardians of a broader public interest”), Richard Zitrin, The Judicial 
Function: Justice Between the Parties, or a Broader Public Interest?, 32 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1565, 1567 (2004) (contending that private dispute resolution is just one 
function of courts; they also have a significant public function), Joseph F. 
Anderson, Jr., Secrecy in the Courts: At the Tipping Point?, 53 VILL. L. REV. 811, 
813 (2008) (noting that “[t]he debate over ‘court-ordered’ secrecy has festered for 
several decades” and concluding that more court transparency is needed), and 
Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1508 Before the Subcomm. 
on Commercial & Admin. Law Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) 
(testimony of Leslie A. Bailey, Staff Att’y, Public Justice) (“In short, through 
protective orders, secret settlements, and sealed court records, the public courts 
are being used by private parties to hide smoking-gun evidence of wrongdoing.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 2, at 811–12 (recounting a fatal accident 
stemming from allegedly faulty tires where information about the defect, 
potentially available from over two hundred related lawsuits, was kept from 
victims by confidentiality orders). 
 4. See, e.g., Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982) 
(determining that to deny sharing between litigants “would be tantamount to 
holding that each litigant who wishes to ride a taxi to court must undertake the 
expense of inventing the wheel”). 
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these orders should allow litigants to share pretrial discovery 
information.5 
This Article examines the systemic harms of confidentiality 
orders and contends that courts should exercise their discretion 
to allow information sharing between similar cases absent 
substantial evidence of countervailing factors. It is the first 
significant piece of legal scholarship to examine court 
confidentiality and discovery sharing in light of the recent and 
contentious proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, approved in May 2014 by the Federal Judicial 
Conference Standing Committee.6 
The current General Motors defective-ignition crisis provides 
a contemporary example of the potential systemic impact of 
restrictive confidentiality orders. While many rightly focus on the 
potential impact of court confidentiality on public safety,7 court 
orders also likely prevented some of the plaintiffs in virtually 
identical lawsuits from sharing discovery information with each 
other. By “silo-ing” discovery information in this way, G.M. (like 
many other litigants engaged in national-scale litigation) forced 
                                                                                                     
 5. Compare Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc., No. CV-09-2209-PHX-
DGC, 2010 WL 1740831, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (denying request for 
sharing provision in protective order out of preference for later intervention and 
modification), and Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (denying request for discovery-sharing provision based on 
conflict with state trade-secret statute), with Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 
346 (Tex. 1987) (mandating discovery-sharing provision in protective order 
absent showing of prejudice to producing party), and Raymond Handling 
Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) 
(allowing trial court discretion to include discovery-sharing provision). 
 6. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT TO THE STANDING 
COMMITTEE 91–94 (May 2, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd 
Policies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST2014-05.pdf [hereinafter COMMITTEE 
REPORT] (enumerating proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure); Tera E. Brostoff, Changes to E-Discovery Approved; “It Should Work,” 
Professor Predicts, 82 U.S.L.W. 1918 (June 2, 2014) (discussing the rationale 
behind the amendments to Rule 37 and predicting the effectiveness of the new 
rule). 
 7. See, e.g., Bill Vlasic, Inquiry by G.M. Is Said to Focus on Its Lawyers, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2014, at A1 (“G.M.’s unwillingness to share information it 
had about defective switches with regulators most likely cost lives in 
accidents.”). 
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its opponents to wastefully reinvent the wheel when conducting 
discovery in each case.8 
Indeed, plaintiffs with identical discovery requests in two 
virtually identical cases might be forced to litigate their 
entitlement to the same information anew in both cases. If courts 
in similar cases simply allowed parties to share discovery, the 
twin lawsuits would consume fewer court and party resources.9 
Multiplied over many cases and many document requests, court 
orders that prevent sharing create a significant drag on the 
system. Based on these efficiency concerns, most commentators 
that have considered the issue support some form of discovery 
sharing.10 
Surprisingly, however, courts are still split on the propriety 
of protective-order provisions that allow information sharing 
between similar cases.11 Some courts have mandated discovery 
sharing, holding that courts abuse their discretion by issuing 
orders that prevent the practice.12 At the other end of the 
spectrum, some courts have recently held that discovery-sharing 
provisions are forbidden in many cases.13 Indeed, federal and 
                                                                                                     
 8. Cf., e.g., Garcia, 734 S.W.2d at 346–48 (finding that nonsharing 
protective orders, in the products liability context, create inefficiency by forcing 
parties to conduct discovery without the benefit of information from previous 
cases). 
 9. See, e.g., id. at 347 (“In addition to making discovery more truthful, 
shared discovery makes the system itself more efficient.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 
1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 464–66, 466 n.61, 495–96 (cataloguing pro-sharing 
action by the legislatures and an ABA commission while endorsing discovery 
sharing); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access 
to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 498–99 (1991) (favoring discovery sharing 
when it actually promotes efficiency); Dore, supra note 1, at 363–65 (same).  
 11. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5 (listing numerous cases in which 
courts have come to differing conclusions concerning protective orders). 
 12. See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 346–48 (Tex. 1987) (“The facts of 
this case do not justify the blanket protective order, and in rendering an 
overbroad order, the trial court abused its discretion.”). 
 13. See Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011) (denying a motion for a protective order on the grounds that it 
would allow dissemination of trade secrets in violation of a state statute); cf. 
Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc., No. CV-09-2209-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 
1740831, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (finding that the presumption of public 
access “is trumped where the defendant establishes good cause to protect 
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state courts across the country, applying similar protective-order 
rules, are increasingly fractured on the issue. 
The dispute about discovery sharing is particularly curious in 
the face of recent and ongoing procedural reform designed to 
make pretrial litigation more efficient. In late May 2014, the 
Federal Judicial Conference Standing Committee on the Rules of 
Practice and Procedure approved significant revisions to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26 to reduce the systemic burdens of 
pretrial discovery.14 These proposed amendments are almost 
certain to become law in December 2015. 
The centerpiece of the changes would highlight the concept of 
“proportionality” as the scope of discovery.15 Proportionality is the 
notion that resources expended on discovery in a given case 
should correlate with the benefits of conducting the discovery.16 
Notably, the proposed amendments are silent about 
discovery sharing.17 But sharing works in tandem with 
proportionality by allowing parties to more accurately tailor 
discovery in cases where the parties are informed by shared 
information. Indeed, the crux of the amendments’ letter and 
spirit—minimizing the undue burdens of pretrial discovery18—
                                                                                                     
discovery materials”). 
 14. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 63–72 (detailing proposed 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Brostoff, supra note 6 
(describing the rationale behind adopting certain amendments to the rules: 
“focusing on the goals of cooperation, proportionality and early case 
management”).  
 15. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 65 (incorporating 
proportionality as Rule 26(b)(1) scope of discovery). 
 16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (limiting discovery when “the burden 
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the 
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues”); see also 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2036 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the rationale 
behind Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’s prohibition on “disproportionate discovery demands”); 
Richard Marcus, Procedural Postcard from America, 1 RUSS. L.J. 9, 19–20 (2013) 
(comparing American notions of proportional discovery with European norms). 
 17. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 80–86. 
 18. See id. at 82 (“The objective is to guard against redundant or 
disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of 
discovery that may be directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of 
inquiry.”). 
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stands in stark contrast to decisions that require parties to craft 
discovery requests in the dark and re-litigate the same discovery 
issues in virtually identical cases. 
Beyond the extent to which discovery sharing complements 
recent procedural reform efforts, it also has many collateral 
benefits, including increased litigation integrity through 
transparency along with, in at least some cases, increased 
accountability for wrongdoing.19 
Part II of this Article examines the court-confidentiality 
problem and its relationship to discovery sharing. Part III 
examines historical and contemporary trends in pretrial 
discovery and their relationship to court confidentiality and 
discovery sharing. Then, in Part IV, the Article proposes some 
baseline discovery-sharing principles and examines the potential 
interaction between these principles and the current proposed 
amendments to the civil rules. 
II. Court Confidentiality 
Popular wisdom holds that courts are open to the public. As 
Atticus Finch presented his unforgettable closing argument in To 
Kill a Mockingbird, spectators watched from packed galleries.20 
Though unjustly divided by race between the lower gallery and 
the balcony, they observed both the presentation of evidence in 
the trial and the unjust conviction of Atticus’s client.21 
                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987) (“Shared 
discovery is an effective means to insure full and fair disclosure. Parties subject 
to a number of suits concerning the same subject matter are forced to be 
consistent in their responses by the knowledge that their opponents can 
compare those responses.”); Dore, supra note 1, at 363–65 (recognizing implicitly 
that shared disclosure may increase accountability by noting that “[t]he desire 
to shield oneself from other potential claims, however, does not alone justify” 
objection to discovery sharing). 
 20. See HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 186–87, 229–35 (Harper 2002) 
(describing the overflowing public courtroom, indicating that not even standing 
room remained to watch the case unfold); see also TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 
(Universal Studios 1962) (using the packed courtroom, open to the public, to 
demonstrate that the case had grasped the attention of the public). 
 21. LEE, supra note 20, at 240. 
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Popular notions of openness aside, the idea that courts and 
their processes are open to the public is only partially accurate. 
While a modern public would no doubt have a constitutional right 
of access to a criminal or civil trial, much of what takes place in 
litigation is not open to public view. In particular, civil discovery 
is often kept confidential through a procedural device known as a 
protective order.22 And because many cases settle during 
discovery and before trial, the general public and other litigants 
involved in virtually identical cases have limited access to 
pretrial discovery information.23 
Confidentiality in litigation, however, comes at a cost. 
According to pro-transparency advocates, keeping public health 
and safety hazards confidential costs lives.24 Beyond the public 
safety issue, litigating individual cases in isolation has a systemic 
impact. Indeed, some have argued that the court system is made 
more expensive and less effective when those same pretrial 
confidentiality orders forbid litigants from sharing discovery in 
one case with litigants in other virtually identical cases.25  
                                                                                                     
 22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(g) (permitting a court to issue a protective 
order to ensure that “a trade secret or other confidential research, development, 
or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified 
way”); see also Judith Resnick, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and 
Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 PENN. L. REV. 
1793, 1814–17 (2014) (describing declining public access to once-public court 
functions, including pretrial discovery). 
 23. See, e.g., Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the 
Rules Governing Public Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 401–02 (2006) (noting that much “litigant-centered” 
information, like discovery, generated through court processes is often kept from 
the public); see also Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable South Carolina Rules Must 
Be Broadened, 55 S.C. L. REV. 883, 886–87 (2004) (describing the lack of judicial 
awareness of lawyer-driven secrecy through discovery and settlements occurring 
outside the view of the court). 
 24. See Zitrin, supra note 2, at 1565–66 (describing a particular case in 
which a plaintiff’s attorney, after agreeing to a “secretized” settlement, 
“[acknowledged] that others may have died later as a consequence” of the 
confidentiality). 
 25. Cf. Dore, supra note 1, at 363 (“Discovery sharing, while arguably 
undermining the efficiency of discovery in the immediate lawsuit, potentially 
avoids the wasteful duplication of discovery in collateral litigation, thereby 
ultimately advancing the efficient resolution of disputes.”). 
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As a prefatory matter, I choose the word “confidential” 
carefully here. Terminology in the confidentiality debate can 
carry a loaded meaning.26 Proponents of more confidentiality, for 
instance, often refer to the issue as one of “privacy.”27 Likewise, 
those who favor more public access to discovery materials 
typically refer to the issue in terms of “secrecy.”28 In this Article, I 
refer to those in favor of less public access as “pro-confidentiality” 
and those in favor of more public access as “pro-transparency,” 
recognizing that neither term connotes those positions with 
perfect neutrality.29 
The following subparts explore the basic protective-order 
framework in the American system and narrower, yet significant, 
problems stemming from the use of pretrial protective orders to 
stifle discovery sharing. 
A. Pretrial Protective Orders 
For more than three decades, courts, scholars, and legislators 
have debated the impact of court confidentiality. For the most 
part, the discussion has centered on public access and the tension 
between the idea that courts are public institutions that express 
public values and the notion that litigants do not sacrifice all 
privacy at the courthouse door.30 And while it is difficult to 
calculate precisely which side has the momentum, it is 
undeniable that pretrial confidentiality is a feature of modern 
litigation.31 
                                                                                                     
 26. Cf. Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to Secrecy in Litigation, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 305, 305 (2006) (suggesting a court-confidentiality vocabulary). 
 27. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 15 (observing the “privacy afforded 
pretrial proceedings” through protective orders). But cf. Marcus, supra note 10, 
at 457 (referring to the issue as “The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy”).  
 28. See, e.g., Zitrin, supra note 2, at 1572 (“In the last five years, secrecy in 
settlements has become an increasingly common subject of articles in the 
popular legal press and more scholarly forums.”). 
 29. See Marder, supra note 26, at 305 (describing the connotations 
associated with certain “loaded terms” often used when addressing the issue of 
confidentiality in discovery). 
 30. See sources cited supra note 2 (listing works of scholarship 
exemplifying the debate surrounding privacy in discovery). 
 31. See, e.g., Dore, supra note 1, at 285 (observing that secrecy is a part of 
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The confidentiality problem is typically framed as pitting the 
public’s interest in knowing against the litigant’s interest in 
confidentiality. In reality, this false binary oversimplifies the 
problem and ignores a third category affected by court 
confidentiality—litigants in separate but similar cases.32 This 
group occupies a special position, with distinct interests in 
accessing discovery information but still regularly excluded from 
access by confidentiality orders.33 
The trend of keeping pretrial litigation information 
confidential from both the public at large and other similar 
litigants pervades all aspects of the trial process. Before trial, 
courts and attorneys working on behalf of litigants liberally 
employ confidentiality orders to closet pretrial discovery from 
anyone outside of each particular case.34  
Many of these cases settle, and settlement agreements often 
contain court-enforceable gag provisions that extend the original 
confidentiality orders indefinitely.35 These agreements, like the 
orders that precede them, often include “return-or-destroy” 
provisions that require the parties to return or destroy all 
discovery information in the case within a few months of 
settlement.36 These mechanisms make it more difficult for the 
                                                                                                     
every phase of civil litigation). 
 32. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 10, at 493–94 (discussing “access for other 
litigants”). 
 33. Cf., e.g., id. (summarizing steps being taken to improve access to 
confidential material produced during discovery for similarly situated litigants). 
 34. See, e.g., Dore, supra note 1, at 332 (“To expedite discovery and avoid 
repeated motions for a protective order regarding every document believed to be 
confidential, parties will frequently agree to, and courts will regularly issue, 
umbrella protective orders.”).  
 35. See, e.g., id. at 290–92 (cataloguing the Civil Rules explicit bent toward 
settling cases); Anderson, supra note 2, at 813 (describing, from a federal judge’s 
perspective, the “take it or leave it” approach of some parties in getting courts to 
ratify secret settlements through court order). 
 36. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 2, at 814 (describing requests from one 
or both of the parties to enter orders with “return or destroy” provisions). Even 
if relevant material is returned to the producing party, that party very well may 
have a duty to preserve it for future litigation. See, e.g., 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 16, § 2284.1 n.4 (discussing the possible sources of an obligation to preserve 
information within control of a party). Compliance with that duty, however, is 
made more difficult to police when protective orders force the return or 
destruction of the material by opposing parties.  
2190 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2014) 
general public and litigants in similar cases to obtain the 
information. Even in cases that make it to trial, some courts have 
recently, and inexplicably, sealed trial testimony and exhibits 
from public view.37 
Almost all facets of the broader court-confidentiality problem 
stem from a common root—protective orders. Confidential 
discovery, via protective orders, takes place in many cases that 
are ultimately settled.38 If parties were unable to keep 
information exchanged in discovery secret in the first place, 
secret settlements would be largely ineffective.39 As a result, it is 
not surprising that the early confidentiality controversy centered 
on appropriateness of protective orders. 
The term “protective order” actually describes several related 
procedural devices that limit discovery.40 But the type of 
protective order most relevant to the court-confidentiality debate 
allows courts to limit the persons to whom discovery information 
may be disclosed.41 To guarantee the confidentiality of pretrial 
discovery materials, these orders are necessary because parties 
may freely disseminate anything they learn in discovery to the 
public at large, absent a contrary court order. 
Described in Rule 26(c)(1)(g), these audience-limiting orders 
mandate that “a trade secret or other confidential research, 
                                                                                                     
 37. See, e.g., Idar v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. C-10-217, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 77568, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2011) (permitting third-party 
intervenors to obtain documents produced by defendant in the current case, 
conditioned upon signing the parties’ confidentiality agreement, and denying 
access to exhibits produced by defendant in previous case under a different 
protective order). 
 38. See Dore, supra note 1, at 384–85 (describing the relationship between 
confidentiality and settlement). 
 39. See id. at 384 (“Secrecy undoubtedly facilitates the settlement process, 
and in some cases, compromise could not be reached without some assurance of 
its confidentiality.”). 
 40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(a)–(g) (enumerating various examples of 
“good cause” for a court to grant a protective order); see also 8A WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 16, § 2036 (stating that “a court is not limited to the eight specified 
types of orders” enumerated in Rule 26(c)). 
 41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(g) (allowing court use of a protective order to 
prevent sensitive commercial information from being disseminated to 
competitors); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(f) (allowing courts to seal 
depositions). 
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development, or commercial information not be revealed or be 
revealed only in a specified way.”42 A particular order under this 
provision might limit disclosure of discovery materials to just 
those participating in the litigation—the parties, their attorneys, 
support staff, and experts.43 A more onerous, and rare, version 
restricts access to only attorneys and consultants—precluding 
even parties from having access to particularly sensitive 
information.44  
The defining feature of an audience-limiting protective order 
is that it allows discovery to go forward while simultaneously 
limiting the audience for the materials. In a way, this type of 
order might be viewed as a pragmatic middle ground.45  
Implicit in the protective-order arrangement is the notion 
that the primary purpose of discovery is to prepare and resolve 
litigation.46 Protective orders are often geared to steer discovery 
information to the appropriate audience for this purpose, even at 
the expense of other legitimate audiences.47 
Nevertheless, under Rule 26, confidentiality is not automatic 
or an entitlement. Indeed, like other protective orders, Rule 
26(c)(1)(g) confidentiality orders may be entered only on a 
showing of “good cause.”48 Under the best formulations of good 
                                                                                                     
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(g). 
 43. See Dore, supra note 1, at 327 (“Courts, for example, may restrict the 
disclosure of such discovery to designated persons or forbid its use for purposes 
unrelated to the preparation and settlement of the case at hand.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1472 
(9th Cir. 1992) (finding a protective order that denied access to party’s in-house 
counsel was not an abuse of discretion). 
 45. Cf. Marcus, supra note 10, at 484–85 (observing that a broad right of 
public access to discovery information would disrupt discovery). 
 46. Cf. Marcus, supra note 2, at 7 (contending that those involved in the 
litigation system operate under “the assumption that any use of discovery 
materials except to prepare for trial is inappropriate”). But see Dustin B. 
Benham, Dirty Secrets: The First Amendment in Protective-Order Litigation, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1808 (2014) (acknowledging that the primary purpose of 
discovery is to prepare for trial but observing that “[e]ven in private litigation, 
parties openly use the system to obtain information” among other collateral 
purposes).  
 47. See Benham, supra note 46, at 1806–08 (arguing that the dissemination 
of discovery information is protected expression). 
 48. See, e.g., Pia v. Supernova Media, Inc., 275 F.R.D. 559, 560 (D. Utah 
2011) (“Under the rule, the party seeking protection has the burden to show 
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cause, a party seeking a protective order must make a 
particularized showing of both the confidential nature of the 
information and the harm that would flow from publicly 
disclosing it.49 Conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific 
evidence, will not justify an order.50  
Still, trial courts have inarguably broad discretion in finding 
good cause and fashioning protective orders, “frequently finding 
protection justified, and frequently denying protection.”51 Even 
discretion, however, has its limits. Multiple courts have 
articulated good cause factors to provide at least a minimal 
structure.52  
But in practice, the good cause standard has proven to be 
largely friendly to routine confidentiality requests, allowing many 
                                                                                                     
good cause for preventing dissemination of discovery materials.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Gelb v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 813 F. Supp. 1022, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (“With respect to [a] claim of confidential business information, [the good 
cause] standard demands that the company prove that disclosure will result in a 
clearly defined and very serious injury to its business.”); Parsons v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (finding the “good cause” requirement 
“to mean that the party seeking the protective order must demonstrate that the 
material sought to be protected is confidential and that disclosure will create a 
competitive disadvantage for the party”). 
 50. See, e.g., Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“‘Good cause’ is established when it is specifically demonstrated that 
disclosure will cause a clearly defined and serious injury. Broad allegations of 
harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples, however, will not suffice.”); cf. 8A 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2035 (“The courts have insisted on a particular 
and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and 
conclusory statements, in order to establish good cause.”); Richard L. Marcus, A 
Modest Proposal: Recognizing (at Last) that the Federal Rules Do Not Declare 
that Discovery Is Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331, 348 (2006) 
(noting that the standards for issuing protective orders are “somewhat exacting” 
but also contending that the substantial burden for obtaining a protective order 
does not imply public right of access in the absence of one). 
 51. 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2043. 
 52. See, e.g., In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 
2011) (balancing the factors enumerated in Glenmede Trust Co. to determine 
whether a party has shown “good cause”); Glenmede Trust Co., 56 F.3d at 483 
(enumerating several factors, “which are neither mandatory nor exhaustive, 
that may be considered in evaluating whether ‘good cause’ exists”); Mosaid 
Techs., Inc. v. LSI Corp., 878 F. Supp. 2d 503, 508 (D. Del. 2012) (“Assessing 
whether good cause exists to seal a judicial transcript generally involves a 
balancing process, in which courts weigh the harm of disclosing information 
against the importance of disclosure to the public.”). 
PROPORTIONALITY, PRETRIAL CONFIDENTIALITY 2193 
courts to enter protective orders as a matter of course in complex 
cases.53 Other courts have recently gone as far as creating a 
standing protective-order form to which the parties may 
stipulate, standardizing the rubber-stamp process.54 
B. Fault Lines in the Protective-Order Debate 
In response to a system that makes it easy to conceal 
discovery information, pro-transparency advocates have waged a 
multi-decade, multi-faceted campaign against protective orders. 
In large measure, these efforts have focused on public access 
questions,55 largely ignoring the impact of court confidentiality on 
the litigation system. Up to this point, the fight has primarily 
revolved around three axes: a First Amendment challenge, a rule-
based right of access argument, and transparency legislation. 
One early line of attack against pretrial protective orders 
was founded in the First Amendment.56 In the late 1970s, pro-
transparency advocates urged a First Amendment basis for 
resisting protective orders: court orders restricting what litigants 
do with information that they obtained in discovery allegedly 
                                                                                                     
 53. See, e.g., Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of 
the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 
715 (2004) (contending, that to a federal district judge, “courts too often rubber-
stamp confidentiality orders presented to them, sometimes altogether ignoring 
or merely giving lip service to the body of law and existing court rules that are 
supposed to apply when the parties request that discovery documents be filed 
under seal”); see also Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785 (3d Cir. 
1994) (observing the trend of some courts to enter protective orders as a matter 
of course “without considering the propriety of such orders, or the countervailing 
public interests which are sacrificed by the orders”). 
 54. See Model Protective Orders, U.S. DIST. COURT N. DIST. CAL., 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/model-protective-orders (last visited Nov. 19, 
2014) (providing “court-approved model forms” for protective orders) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 55. See, e.g., Zitrin, supra note 2, at 1567 (arguing in favor of transparency 
on the grounds that “[o]nce the disputants go to court, the public nature of the 
forum trumps the formerly private nature of the dispute”). 
 56. For a full analysis of the current relationship between the First 
Amendment and pretrial protective orders, see generally Benham, supra note 
46, at 1785–86. 
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violated the Constitution’s free-speech guarantee.57 Early cases 
considering the argument suggested that confidentiality orders 
did not violate the First Amendment.58  
But in 1979, the D.C. Circuit entered the fray and set off a 
firestorm by applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a protective 
order.59 If this view prevailed, many protective orders would be 
doomed. The Supreme Court, in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart,60 
responded. Justice Lewis Powell, writing for a unanimous court, 
rejected the D.C. Circuit’s strict-scrutiny approach and instead 
held that, although the First Amendment did protect those who 
disclose discovery information, the special context of civil 
litigation implicated free-speech concerns to a lesser extent than 
in other contexts.61 While courts and commentators continue to 
debate the meaning of the case,62 multiple courts have held that 
Seattle Times effectively removed the First Amendment from the 
protective-order analysis.63 
                                                                                                     
 57. Cf., e.g., Michael Dore, Confidentiality Orders—The Proper Role of the 
Courts in Providing Confidential Treatment for Information Disclosed Through 
the Pre-Trial Discovery Process, 14 N. ENG. L. REV. 1, 10–14 (1978) (examining 
the role of the First Amendment regarding protective orders). 
 58. See Int’l Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[W]e 
entertain no doubt as to the constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to 
forbid the publicizing, in advance of trial, of information obtained by one party 
from another by use of the court’s process.”). 
 59. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Even if the order 
is relatively narrow, however, it restrains the petitioner from communicating 
matters of public importance for an indefinite period of time. As such it 
constitutes direct governmental action limiting speech and must be carefully 
scrutinized in light of the first amendment.”). 
 60. 476 U.S. 20 (1984).  
 61. See id. at 37 (“[W]here . . . a protective order is entered on a showing of 
good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil 
discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained 
from other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Benham, supra note 46, at 1804–14 (arguing that protective 
orders implicate significant First Amendment concerns). 
 63. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 462–63 (“[A]ll are agreed that the broad 
[First Amendment] prior restraint argument that captured attention in the 
early 1980s no longer has force.”). Compare Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 
F.2d 1108, 1114 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that “[d]espite the Supreme Court’s 
apparent endorsement in the above passage of a least restrictive means 
analysis, its holding requires only a good cause analysis”), with Anderson v. 
Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 1986) (interpreting Seattle Times to 
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Soon after the Court decided Seattle Times, a few 
commentators and courts cited the case to preclude discovery 
sharing between similar litigants.64 That approach has been 
roundly rejected because the case simply did not address the 
propriety of sharing.65 Indeed, if anything, courts allowing 
discovery sharing would impose a lesser speech restriction on 
litigants than that approved by the Seattle Times court.66 
On another front in the court-confidentiality fight, 
transparency proponents have also contended that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure create a right of third-party access to 
discovery materials.67 Under a previous version of Rule 5(d), all 
discovery materials had to be filed with the court.68 The 
reasoning went that the public had a common-law right to access 
the unsealed contents of a court file.69 Because discovery was on 
                                                                                                     
apply “heightened” scrutiny to the practice of issuing protective orders and 
allowing some role for the First Amendment in the granting of particular 
protective orders). But see Benham, supra note 46, at 1804–14 (“The Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Seattle Times, recent Court statements, and an assessment of 
the nature of both protective orders and the speech that they restrict make clear 
that so-called intermediate scrutiny applies”).  
 64. See, e.g., Rich Arthurs, Defendants Fight Back on Data Sharing, LEGAL 
TIMES, July 16, 1984, at 1 (describing Ford Motor Company’s attempt to use 
trade secret protection to prevent plaintiffs’ attorneys from sharing crash test 
data); Gary L. Wilson, Note, Seattle Times: What Effect on Discovery Sharing?, 
1985 WIS. L. REV. 1055, 1056–57 (noting that the first court to apply Seattle 
Times “relied on the rationales enunciated by the Supreme Court and granted a 
protective order prohibiting the dissemination of discovered information to 
parties involved in similar litigation”). 
 65. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 10, at 495 (“[I]t is difficult to see how the 
[Seattle Times] Court’s reasoning should prompt other courts to curtail access 
for use in other litigation.”). 
 66. See Benham, supra note 46, at 1823 (explaining that courts utilize 
sharing protective orders to allow litigants to share discovery with litigants in 
similar cases).  
 67. See Seymour Moskowitz, Discovering Discovery: Non-Party Access to 
Pretrial Information in the Federal Courts 1938–2006, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 817, 
865–75 (2007) (arguing that a presumption of access to discovery material was 
“created by the combination of the Rule 5(d) filing requirement and the Rule 26 
good cause provision”).  
 68. For a thorough history of changes to Rule 5(d) and the implications for 
access arguments, see id. at 833–53. 
 69. See id. at 861–64 (observing that a general right to inspect and copy 
both judicial and public records and documents existed).  
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file, or supposed to be, the public had a putative right to access 
depositions, interrogatory responses, and other discovery 
responses.70 
A series of rules amendments, culminating in a 2000 
amendment that forbids parties from filing discovery unless in 
connection with a proceeding or pursuant to a court order,71 
effectively ended the Rule 5-based argument for a right of access 
to unfiled discovery.72 
Transparency, or “Sunshine,” legislation is yet another front 
in the fight against protective orders. For more than a decade, the 
Sunshine in Litigation Act has been filed, and re-filed, in both 
branches of Congress but has never become law.73 Indeed, in May 
2014, Senators Blumenthal and Graham reintroduced the 
legislation as the Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014 (SILA 
2014).74 
The current act would require district courts to consider the 
health and safety implications of both protective orders (even 
agreed protective orders) and settlement agreements before 
approving them.75 In particular, courts could not approve 
                                                                                                     
 70. See, e.g., Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978) 
(“As a general proposition, pretrial discovery must take place in the public 
unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public access to the 
proceedings.”). 
 71. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) (2000). 
 72. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 50, at 333 (“[A]mendments to the Rules 
that forbid the filing of most discovery in court . . . further support the proposal 
that the notion of the Rules themselves commanding public access should be 
laid to rest.”). But see generally Moskowitz, supra note 67 (indicating a 
presumption of access to discovery materials). 
 73. See Mary Elizabeth Keaney, Note, Don’t Steal My Sunshine: 
Deconstructing the Flawed Presumption of Privacy for Unfiled Documents 
Exchanged During Discovery, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 795, 798 (2011) (noting that the 
bill was originally introduced in 1993 by Senator Herbert Kohl, and it has been 
reintroduced annually ever since). 
 74. S. 2364, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 75. See id. § 2 (as introduced by Senate, May 20, 2014) 
Amends the federal judicial code to prohibit a court, in any civil 
action in which the pleadings state facts relevant to protecting public 
health or safety, from entering an order restricting the disclosure of 
information obtained through discovery, approving a settlement 
agreement that would restrict such disclosure, or restricting access to 
court records, subject to exceptions, unless the court has first made 
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protective orders unless a “specific and substantial interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of the records” outweighed the 
public interest in disclosure of “potential health or safety 
hazards.”76  
Though primarily focused on giving the public access, SILA 
2014 would also have implications for litigants seeking to share 
information between related cases. If the public has access to 
discovery materials so, presumably, would litigants in other 
similar cases as members of the public. And the Act’s nexus to 
public health and safety would often preclude protective orders in 
the very class of cases that benefit most from discovery sharing—
products liability and tort actions involving products and injuries 
of national proportions.77 As Congress considers SILA 2014, it 
should consider the negative impact on court efficiency stemming 
from protective orders along with the impact on public safety.  
Additionally, some state legislatures have considered and 
passed transparency and sunshine legislation, including at least 
one statute that specifically addresses discovery sharing.78 Still, 
the momentum for sunshine legislation in many states tapered 
off in the mid-1990s.79  
With the constitutional front in the fight against protective 
orders largely dormant, the rule-based front effectively dead, and 
                                                                                                     
independent findings of fact that: (1) the order would not restrict the 
disclosure of information relevant to the protection of public health or 
safety or (2) the public interest in the disclosure of past, present, or 
potential health or safety hazards is outweighed by a specific and 
substantial interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the 
information and the requested protective order is no broader than 
necessary to protect the confidentiality interest asserted.  
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. (prohibiting protective orders in cases “in which the pleadings 
state facts that are relevant to the protection of public health or safety”). 
 78. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a (mandating a strict balancing test before courts 
may enter protective orders restricting access to unfiled discovery that 
implicates public health and safety); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2014) 
(forbidding court orders restricting disclosure of information concerning public 
hazards); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (2014) (forbidding protective orders that 
stifle discovery sharing).  
 79. But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-112 (2014) (forbidding, by statute 
passed in 2005, certain court orders that have “the purpose or effect of 
concealing a public hazard”). 
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the legislative front pending, the discovery-sharing discussion 
often takes place in the context of trial court discretion.80 The 
next subpart focuses on the relationship between protective-order 
discretion and discovery sharing. 
C. Sharing Discovery in Similar Cases 
Litigants often seek to use discovery information obtained in 
one case to prepare and develop another related case.81 The 
concept known as “discovery sharing” flows from a basic, 
uncontested proposition: Litigants may freely distribute discovery 
information unless a valid court order forbids them from doing 
so.82 And even if a court order limits how parties use discovery 
information, judges have broad discretion to refuse dissemination 
                                                                                                     
 80. See, e.g., Ashley A. Kutz, Note, Rethinking The “Good Cause” 
Requirement: A New Federal Approach to Granting Protective Orders Under 
F.R.C.P. 26(c), 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 291, 293 (2007) (describing approaches to 
determining good cause that range from “rubber-stamping” proposed protective 
orders to “hostility toward confidentiality,” analyzing various circuits’ 
approaches to “good cause,” and proposing an improved protective-order process 
under 26(c)). 
 81. See, e.g., Idar v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. C-10-217, 2011 WL 
688871, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2011) (denying a protective order modification 
while acknowledging that the order allows for “sharing of discovered 
information with attorneys and other necessary persons representing parties 
with present or future cases pending against Defendant that arise out of the 
same or similar set of facts, transactions, or occurrences”); Wal-Mart Stores E., 
L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (noting 
respondents’ request for a sharing provision to include collateral litigants); 
Pincheira v. Allstate Ins. Co., 190 P.3d 322, 337 (N.M. 2008) (“The parties and 
amici recognize that this case is really about discovery sharing, both with other 
litigants and with the public at large.”); Cowan v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06-
1330-MLB, 2007 WL 1796198, at *5 (D. Kan. June 19, 2007) (“The Court 
recognizes the public policy benefit of potentially sharing documents with 
attorneys involved in litigation of a similar product with similar issues.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984) 
(holding that where “a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause as 
required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and 
does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other 
sources, it does not offend the First Amendment”); see also Moskowitz, supra 
note 67, at 825 (“Absent a protective order, a plaintiff or defendant has the right 
to disseminate information obtained during discovery so long as the purpose for 
sharing is lawful.”). 
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to one group (e.g., the media) and allow dissemination to another 
(e.g., litigants in similar, but separate, litigation).83  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys typically contend that sharing 
information between similar cases allows them to avoid 
wastefully reinventing the wheel by repeatedly conducting 
virtually identical discovery.84 Beyond these efficiency gains, 
sharing proponents contend that exchanging information allows 
isolated plaintiffs to prepare cases collaboratively, leveling the 
playing field with large law firms and national collaboration on 
the other side of the docket. Sharing also increases discovery 
accountability by allowing parties to compare discovery responses 
against responses in a similar case.85 
Despite the apparent benefits, disputes about the propriety of 
sharing have persisted for decades.86 Indeed, in the early 1990s, 
one leading pro-confidentiality commentator had already noted 
that the debate over so-called discovery sharing was 
“retrograde.”87 Some courts’ continued reticence to allow it is 
curious, particularly considering the overwhelming consensus 
                                                                                                     
 83. See, e.g., Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 885, 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that it is within trial courts’ discretion 
to allow sharing with similar litigants while denying access to the general 
public). 
 84. See FRANCIS H. HARE, JR. ET AL., CONFIDENTIALITY ORDERS 69–70 (John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1988) (contending that discovery, as a result of nonsharing 
protective orders, “must be repeated anew in every case,” with the trial courts 
being forced to intervene in a repetition of the same discovery disputes); Ward v. 
Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982) (asserting that denying 
sharing between litigants “would be tantamount to holding that each litigant 
who wishes to ride a taxi to court must undertake the expense of inventing the 
wheel”). 
 85. See, e.g., FRANCIS H. HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: COMBATING 
STONEWALLING AND OTHER DISCOVERY ABUSES 166 (ATLA Press 1995) (arguing 
that “information sharing also provides plaintiffs the opportunity to verify the 
completeness and accuracy of a defendant manufacturer’s response to discovery 
request”); cf. Marcus, supra note 10, at 495–96 (“In addition, in some cases 
access may prevent efforts to mislead the court in the second case.”). 
 86. Compare Campbell, supra note 2, at 824 (opposing information sharing 
on the ground that it creates waste and threatens proprietary interests of 
parties), with Marcus, supra note 10, at 495–96 (observing that discovery 
sharing benefits the litigation system), and Rhiana Sharp, Comment, Let in a 
Little Sunshine: Limiting Confidential Settlements in Missouri, 69 MO. L. REV. 
215, 229 (2004) (“Discovery sharing should be encouraged.”). 
 87. Marcus, supra note 10, at 495.  
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among commentators and litigation experts that the practice is 
appropriate and does indeed increase court efficiency.88 
At one time or another, the Federal Courts Study Committee, 
an American Bar Association commission, the Federal Judicial 
Center, state legislatures, and the authors of the discovery and 
protective order sections of the leading federal practice treatise 
have all endorsed some form of shared discovery.89 Even those 
who have strenuously opposed widespread public disclosure of 
discovery information have conceded that an appropriate 
nonparty use of discovery is to prepare for related cases distinct 
from the case in which the discovery materials are first 
obtained.90  
But despite broad support for the concept of discovery 
sharing and the regular recurrence of the issue in products-
liability and other complex litigation, courts around the country 
are in disarray about if, when, and how to allow the practice.91 In 
part, this fracture traces subtle disagreements among 
commentators on the proper method to share discovery 
information among cases.92 First, both commentators and courts 
disagree about which procedural mechanism is most appropriate 
to enable sharing.93 Courts typically employ one of two sharing 
                                                                                                     
 88. See id. at 495 (noting that “courts continue to recognize that access for 
other plaintiffs should be allowed whether or not it is necessary to facilitate the 
preparation of the case before them because such sharing saves the courts and 
the litigants time and money”). 
 89. See sources cited supra note 10 (citing examples of commentators who 
endorse discovery sharing); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.432 
(2004) (endorsing sharing). 
 90. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 10, at 498–99 (“The judge should 
consider . . . the benefits of making the material available in other lawsuits and 
the economies achieved when lawyers collaborate in preparing their 
cases. . . . [T]he adjudicatory system will often be well-served by allowing the 
pooling of discovery materials . . . .”). 
 91. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5. 
 92. Compare Marcus, supra note 2, at 41–42 (mandating that collateral 
litigants establish entitlement to discovery information before sharing and 
thereby establishing intervention and modification as the preferred sharing 
mechanism), with David Timmins, Note, Protective Orders in Products Liability 
Litigation: Striking the Proper Balance, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1543 
(1991) (preferring protective orders with sharing provisions). 
 93. Compare Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc., No. CV-09-2209-PHX-
DGC, 2010 WL 1740831, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (“[T]he court that entered 
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mechanisms: sharing provisions included in protective orders 
from the outset (“upfront” sharing provisions) or later protective-
order modifications.  
Second, courts and commentators disagree about the latitude 
trial courts have to grant or deny requests for sharing in either of 
the two common forms. In some jurisdictions, upfront sharing 
provisions are mandatory94 absent countervailing factors, while 
other courts have discretion to grant or deny sharing requests.95 
And in at least one jurisdiction, entering a sharing protective 
order can be an abuse of discretion under certain circumstances.96 
This subpart illuminates these fault lines by examining the 
two common sharing mechanisms in turn. 
                                                                                                     
the protective order must ‘satisfy itself that the protected discovery is 
sufficiently relevant to the collateral litigation that a substantial amount of 
duplicative discovery will be avoided by modifying the protective order.’”), and 
Marcus, supra note 2, at 41 (arguing that nonparty access may be justified 
“when litigants seek to obtain evidence relevant to other litigation”), with Garcia 
v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. 1987) (deciding that, due to “[t]he public 
policies favoring shared information,” the trial court erred in granting a 
protective order that prohibited the free exchange of discovered documents), and 
Timmins, supra note 92, at 1543 (advocating for sharing provisions in protective 
orders). 
 94. See Garcia, 734 S.W.2d at 346 (indicating that “balanced against 
concerns for confidentiality . . . are the public policies favoring the exchange of 
information” which “require that any protective order be carefully 
tailored . . . while allowing an exchange of discovered documents”). 
 95. See Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
885, 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“To protect the privilege accorded to trade secrets 
in Evidence Code section 1060 . . . a trial court must balance the interests of 
both sides . . . a three-step process.”). 
 96. See Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]o the extent a sharing provision is used, the provision must 
be narrowly tailored in scope and balanced with the need to protect the 
confidential nature of the documents sought to be discovered and the 
established need of the known collateral litigant to view the discovery.”); Cordis 
Corp. v. O’Shea, 988 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that a 
protective order permitting products-liability plaintiffs to release a 
manufacturer’s confidential information from discovery to attorneys not 
representing the parties or those in a collateral litigation was a departure from 
the essential requirements of law). 
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1. Upfront Sharing Provisions 
Whether to include sharing provisions in protective orders 
from the outset comes up frequently in products-liability 
litigation. For instance, suppose that a party, WidgetCo, produces 
particularly dangerous widgets from 2010–2013. The widget 
injures Sally.  
In turn, Sally sues WidgetCo on a products-liability theory 
and seeks discovery related to widget designs. WidgetCo objects, 
contending that the widget designs comprise competitively 
sensitive commercial information. The trial judge orders 
WidgetCo to produce the designs but simultaneously issues a 
protective order to keep the litigants from disclosing WidgetCo’s 
proprietary information to the public and, more specifically, 
competitors. Before the judge issues the protective order, 
however, she has to decide whether to include an upfront 
discovery-sharing provision, or not.97  
The nonsharing scenario: The protective order forbids 
anyone in the case from disclosing discovery information to 
anyone other than the parties, their attorneys, their attorneys’ 
office staff, and experts.98 Failure to abide by the order is 
punishable by contempt. The protective order also includes a 
“return-and-destroy” provision that requires Sally and her 
lawyers to return all discovery information to WidgetCo at the 
end of the litigation and destroy any information that is not 
returned.99 
The sharing scenario: In contrast, imagine that the 
protective order forbids disseminating discovery information to 
anyone but the parties, attorneys, office staff, experts, and those 
                                                                                                     
 97. One form or another of this hypothetical is a frequently repeated fact 
pattern in courts around the country. See, e.g., Williams v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 
1:06-CV-0051-RWS, 2006 WL 1835437 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006) (illustrating a 
fact pattern akin to the aforementioned hypothetical). 
 98. Cf., e.g., Menendez ex rel. Menendez v. Wal-Mart Stores E. LP, No. 
1:10-CV-53, 2012 WL 90140, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 11, 2012) (forbidding sharing 
upon finding that the nonsharing protective order was not too restrictive). 
 99. Cf., e.g., Hamm v. Matlack, Inc., No. 95-20-FR, 1995 WL 405250, at *1 
(D. Or. June 21, 1995) (requiring the return of protected documents at the 
conclusion of the litigation). 
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same categories of people in substantially similar litigation.100 
The sharing protective order further defines “substantially 
similar litigation” to include pending litigation involving 
allegedly defective widgets manufactured between 2010–2013 
that allegedly injured a person.  
The sharing order also specifically forbids dissemination of 
the information to WidgetCo’s competitors, even if they would 
otherwise be eligible to share in the information.101 Like the 
nonsharing order, anyone who violates the sharing order is 
subject to contempt. Moreover, the order requires any person 
receiving WidgetCo’s discovery information to agree to be bound 
by the order’s terms, including its contempt provision.102 
Various courts routinely issue both types of protective 
orders.103 The practical implications of the courts’ choice are 
significant to both litigants and the broader system. The 
nonsharing order allows the litigants to use discovery information 
to prepare only the case at hand. This approach is consistent with 
the primary purpose of discovery—to prepare the case at hand for 
trial.  
But it is simultaneously inconsistent, at least in part, with 
Rule 1’s command that the Civil Rules be “construed and 
administered” to secure the “speedy [] and inexpensive 
                                                                                                     
 100. Cf., e.g., Raymond Handling Concepts, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 888 
(balancing the public interest in information sharing among litigants in similar 
cases and litigant confidentiality interests while upholding a sharing order). 
 101. Cf., e.g., Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. 1987) (holding 
that courts can require those wishing to share discovery material to certify that 
they will not release it to competitors). 
 102. Cf., e.g., id. at 346 
Nothing herein shall prevent the exhibition of the documents and 
other materials covered by this protective order to experts who are 
assisting counsel in the preparation of this matter for trial, if such 
counsel has first obtained the written agreement of such persons to be 
bound by the terms of this Order. 
 103. Compare Idar v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. C-10-217, 2011 WL 
688871 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2011) (sharing order), and Cowan v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., No. 06-1330-MLB, 2007 WL 1796198 (D. Kan. June 19, 2007) (sharing 
order), with Williams v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0051-RWS, 2006 WL 
1835437, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006) (nonsharing order), and Jochims v. 
Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 145 F.R.D. 499, 502–03 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (nonsharing order). 
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determination of every action and proceeding.”104 While the 
nonsharing order may allow parties in the primary case to 
prepare for trial, it simultaneously stops other litigants from 
efficiently preparing other similar cases.105  
Likewise, imagine an attorney with two separate, but 
similar, cases in two courts. Further imagine a strict nonsharing 
protective order in one case that specifically provided that 
discovery should only be used “for purposes of this litigation.” The 
order would force the attorney to repeat the same discovery in the 
other case even though the attorney would already have the 
discovery materials sitting in her office. 
The sharing protective order, on the other hand, allows Sally 
to disseminate the information not only within the Sally v. 
WidgetCo case but also to other related litigation—obviating the 
need for repetitive discovery.106 And it does so without 
undermining the WidgetCo interests that the court sought to 
protect. The value of WidgetCo’s information stems from the fact 
that WidgetCo’s competitors do not have access to it, and the 
protective order specifically forbids Sally, or anyone else receiving 
the discovery information, from providing it to a competitor.107  
Of course, protective orders can be violated and, as a matter 
of simple probability, each additional person who receives the 
information under the sharing order makes it marginally more 
likely that the information makes its way to a competitor.108 But 
decades of experience with sharing protective orders shows that 
                                                                                                     
 104. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added).  
 105. See, e.g., Kamp Implement Co., Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 630 F. Supp. 218, 
220 (D. Mont. 1986) (stating that a nonsharing order “would result in 
duplication of time and effort [by the court] in each instance where discovery is 
sought”). 
 106. See, e.g., Garcia, 734 S.W.2d at 346–47 (recognizing that allowing 
information exchanges between similarly situated litigants would enhance full 
disclosure and efficiency in the trial system). 
 107. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) 
(noting, in the takings context, that the value of trade secret potentially is 
diminished only in circumstances where the government orders disclosure of 
“trade secret to others who are under no obligation to protect the confidentiality 
of the information”). 
 108. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 2, at 824 (positing that the likelihood of 
protective-order violations increases with each disclosure of discovery 
information). 
PROPORTIONALITY, PRETRIAL CONFIDENTIALITY 2205 
violations are relatively rare and violations involving a leak to a 
competitor are virtually nonexistent.109 And nonsharing orders, 
like sharing orders, can be violated. Considering the size of some 
in-house litigation staffs and the large numbers of outside 
counsel who staff complex lawsuits, it is feasible that a even 
nonsharing order could provide access to dozens, if not hundreds, 
of people. Thus, arguments about increased potential harm from 
sharing orders ignore those same risks in nonsharing orders. 
The sharing protective order also seems to create efficiencies 
for WidgetCo—the order would seem to reduce WidgetCo’s own 
discovery expenses in future cases.110 This benefit is particularly 
important in repeating-case contexts, like products liability. 
Mass-produced products that face defect allegations tend to 
injure more than one person.111 In theory, the basic factual 
premise—that the product is defective and causes injury—is the 
same in each case, so discovery from one to another substantially 
overlaps.112 Thus, under the sharing order, WidgetCo could 
simply provide discovery from the primary case to subsequent 
cases to expedite the process. 
At least one antisharing commentator has contended sharing 
provisions in protective orders will encourage defendants not to 
cooperate in discovery, increasing systemic costs.113 This 
argument (like many on the prosharing side) has neither been 
                                                                                                     
 109. But see, e.g., McDonald v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 186 F. App’x 930, 
932 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding sanctions imposed for providing protected 
discovery materials to unauthorized persons involved in collateral litigation). 
 110. See Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 775 N.W.2d 302, 309–10 (Iowa 2009) 
(marveling at Microsoft’s expenditures to respond to a single discovery order—
over $5.5 million—and viewing any ruling that required repetition of that feat 
with incredulity). 
 111. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 198 F.R.D. 654, 655 (S.D. 
Ind. 2001) (“The [Firestone] tires have been linked to the deaths of 148 
Americans, and 6.5 million tires were recalled on August 9, 2000.”). 
 112. Of course, in practice, litigants often dispute whether the defect that 
injured one plaintiff is the same as the defect that injured another. But in a 
significant number of cases (e.g., the same allegedly faulty airbag sensor in a 
particular make, model, and year of car) the issues and discovery largely 
overlap. 
 113. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 824 (“Defendants faced with the 
prospect that documents produced in one case will generate similar claims 
throughout the country will more aggressively resist disclosure.”). 
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confirmed nor refuted by empirical evidence, leaving courts to 
grapple with the potential benefits and costs of sharing.  
With experience and common sense, at least, supporting the 
notion that avoiding repetitive discovery saves resources, why 
would a defendant, like WidgetCo, ever insist on a nonsharing 
order? In many cases, the putative reason for requesting a 
nonsharing order—to protect competitive information—may be 
pretextual. Perhaps one reason a defendant, like WidgetCo, 
would seek a nonsharing order might be to gain a long-term 
advantage in repeating litigation.114  
By limiting the information to the case at hand, nonsharing 
orders increase the time and expense of bringing claims against 
the defendant.115 And the orders also isolate litigants in similar 
cases from one another, stifling collaboration among, and 
decreasing the efficacy of, plaintiffs’ counsel.116  
Using the WidgetCo hypothetical, imagine that the widget 
injures another plaintiff, John. John files suit against WidgetCo. 
With a nonsharing order in place in Sally’s case, Sally’s lawyers 
cannot reveal to John’s lawyers what they learned about the 
widget or WidgetCo’s conduct through discovery. John’s lawyers 
do not have the benefit of WidgetCo’s previous responses and 
must invest time and resources to conduct the discovery treasure 
hunt all over again.  
Meanwhile, WidgetCo’s attorneys would presumably have 
the benefit of a national network of outside counsel to weigh a 
coordinated response.117 Those lawyers, unlike John’s, would have 
the benefit of collective knowledge of the impact of particular 
discovery information on later discovery disputes, merits rulings, 
and settlement negotiations. 
                                                                                                     
 114. Antisharing commentators have admitted as much. See Campbell, 
supra note 2, at 824. 
 115. See, e.g., Comes, 775 N.W.2d at 311 (describing “staggering” costs of 
repeating discovery in a second case involving similar issues). 
 116. See Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 153–54 (W.D. Tex. 
1980) (reasoning that collaboration between plaintiffs’ counsel furthers Rule 1 
interests); Marcus, supra note 10, at 495 (noting the common plaintiffs’ 
complaint about protective orders stifling collaboration). 
 117. See HARE, JR. ET AL., supra note 84, at 21 (“Corporate defendants have 
achieved efficiency by using economies of scale, regional or national 
coordination, and cost spreading among related cases.”). 
PROPORTIONALITY, PRETRIAL CONFIDENTIALITY 2207 
Forcing each plaintiff to conduct discovery from this isolated 
position has two immediate benefits for WidgetCo. First, it raises 
the cost and effort required to bring suits against WidgetCo.118 
Requiring each plaintiff to expend resources litigating discovery 
disputes anew makes cases less economically desirable. 
Theoretically, this barrier to entry reduces the number of 
lawsuits against the company.  
Second, not all plaintiffs’ counsel are created equal, and some 
are undoubtedly more proficient at conducting discovery than 
others. By requiring each plaintiff’s attorney to stand on her own, 
WidgetCo gains a net advantage against weaker litigators when 
compared with a system that allowed those same lawyers to 
collaborate with more-skilled lawyers. Moreover, allowing parties 
to compare current discovery responses with previously produced 
material may allow detection of discovery misconduct, like 
perjury in a deposition or omitted documents in response to a 
request for production. 
Faced with these competing concerns, courts have considered 
whether efficiency and plaintiffs’ interest in collaboration 
outweigh defendants’ interest in protecting competitively 
sensitive information and the potential systemic costs of allegedly 
disruptive sharing provisions.119  
At one end of the spectrum, an early and seminal discovery-
sharing case found a court abused its discretion by denying a 
request for a discovery-sharing provision.120 Noting that truth 
seeking in litigation is often hampered by the “adversarial 
approach to discovery,” the court held that “shared discovery is 
an effective means to insure full and fair disclosure.”121 It went on 
                                                                                                     
 118. See, e.g., Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 775 N.W.2d 302, 310–11 (Iowa 2009) 
(“When we add to the mix the time, money, and effort expended by counsel and 
support staff for the Iowa plaintiffs in organizing and analyzing the information 
after Microsoft produced it, the staggering cost of repeating the process in the 
Canadian litigation comes even more sharply into focus.”). 
 119. See Wolhar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 712 A.2d 464, 469 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1997) (weighing proprietary interests against the interest in efficient litigation). 
 120. See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. 1987) (finding that the 
trial court abused its discretion by denying discovery sharing). 
 121. Id. at 347. Garcia was decided under a state rule of civil procedure that 
differed somewhat from Rule 26(c), but the court implied that the opinion’s 
reasoning was also applicable to a revised rule that more closely mirrored Fed. 
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to note that the efficiency sharing generates was among the 
“public policies” favoring upfront sharing orders.122 
Other courts have endorsed sharing but have given trial 
courts discretion to include upfront sharing provisions or not. For 
example, in Raymond Handling Concepts Corporation v. Superior 
Court,123 a California court refused to disturb a trial court’s 
protective order, finding that the court had properly exercised its 
discretion to allow discovery sharing.124 
Still other courts, particularly in the federal system, have 
been hostile to upfront sharing provisions. For instance, in Long 
v. TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc.,125 both parties agreed that 
some type of protective order was appropriate but disputed the 
propriety of a sharing provision in the protective order.126 
Rejecting the provision, the court insisted that the proper 
procedure to share discovery required collateral litigants to 
intervene after the fact and seek to modify the nonsharing 
protective order.127 According to the court, “a collateral 
litigant . . . should not be granted automatic access to a 
defendant’s confidential documents.”128  
In recent years, the sharing–nonsharing protective-order rift 
has deepened. Florida appellate courts have twice reversed 
sharing protective orders as an abuse of trial-court discretion.129 
                                                                                                     
R. Civ. P. 26(c). See id. at 345 n.1 (reasoning that Texas’s recent amendments 
would change the state rule of civil procedure to more closely resemble the 
federal rule).  
 122. See id. at 346–47 (stating that the public policies supporting sharing 
“require that any protective order be carefully tailored to protect [the 
defendant’s] proprietary interests while allowing an exchange of discovered 
documents”). 
 123. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
 124. See id. at 888. 
 125. No. CV-09-2209-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 1740831 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010). 
 126. See id. at *1 (describing disagreement between parties regarding 
whether a protective order should contain a sharing provision). 
 127. See id. (noting that a nonsharing protective order does not preclude 
sharing of discovery forever). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011) (denying request for sharing order when proposed sharing 
provision conflicted with Florida trade-secret statute); Cordis Corp. v. O’Shea, 
988 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (denying sharing order in favor 
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In contrast to California and Texas, one Florida court forbade 
upfront sharing when the provisions potentially interfered with 
other courts’ discovery rulings or state trade-secret law.130 
According to the court, discovery sharing could be better 
accomplished through later case-by-case protective-order 
modifications.131 
Thus, there is currently a three-way split among jurisdictions 
on when and how to allow discovery sharing. While some courts 
favor later protective-order modifications to upfront sharing 
provisions, the modification landscape is itself fractured in a way 
that threatens the viability of sharing in some cases. 
2. Modification 
Courts have long been in split on the proper standard for 
modifying protective orders to allow discovery sharing.132 
Building on the WidgetCo hypothetical above: Imagine 
that the court in the WidgetCo v. Sally products-liability case (the 
original case) enters a nonsharing protective order to protect 
WidgetCo’s confidential information. The order restricts discovery 
access to the WidgetCo v. Sally parties, their attorneys, legal 
staff, and experts in the case. Later, John, a litigant in a similar 
case in another court, asks the WidgetCo v. Sally court to allow 
him and his attorneys access to the WidgetCo v. Sally discovery 
information for use in John’s lawsuit. May the court modify the 
                                                                                                     
of later modification when protective order did not identify collateral litigants).  
 130. See Wal-Mart, 81 So. 3d at 490 (refusing to uphold a sharing order 
when it might violate Florida trade-secret law); Cordis Corp., 988 So. 2d at 1167 
(fearing that the sharing order might contradict other courts’ discovery rulings). 
 131. See Wal-Mart, 81 So. 3d at 489 (favoring a protective-order modification 
over granting a sharing order); Cordis Corp., 988 So. 2d at 1167 (preferring a 
case-by-case determination to modify protective orders instead of granting 
sharing orders). 
 132. Compare Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 
1979) (requiring “extraordinary circumstance or compelling need” to modify 
protective order), with Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1301 (7th Cir. 
1980) (concluding that collateral litigants in similar cases are “presumptively 
entitled to access” protected discovery), superseded by rule as stated in Bond v. 
Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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protective order to permit John access and under what terms? It 
turns out that the answer varies across jurisdictions. 
Most courts agree on the basic framework for protective-
order modification. For starters, courts retain the power to 
modify their own protective orders, even after the litigation 
ends.133 Similar to the broad discretion courts have to fashion 
protective orders in the first place, courts have substantial 
latitude to make changes to existing orders.  
Both parties and nonparties to the order may move to 
modify.134 And in the federal system, most courts agree that 
nonparties must seek permission to intervene pursuant to Rule 
24(b) before, or at the same time, they request to modify the 
order.135 
But permission to intervene establishes only that the third 
party gets to ask the court to modify the protective order; 
permission to intervene does not answer the more important 
question of whether the order should actually be modified.136 
Thus, disputes generally turn on the standard to modify, not the 
standard to intervene under Rule 24(b).137 
                                                                                                     
 133. See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 
1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that the district court had power to modify 
protective order in closed case). But see Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1079 
(7th Cir. 2009) (foreclosing the possibility that the district court had inherent 
authority to revisit and rescind the protective order). 
 134. See, e.g., 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2044.1 (“[O]rdinarily 
requests to modify are directed to the district court’s discretion and subject to 
review only for abuse of discretion.”). 
 135. See, e.g., EEOC v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1045 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that parties must abide by Rule 24(b) when attempting 
to modify an order). 
 136. See, e.g., In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 245 F.R.D. 632, 635 (D. Minn. 2007) (granting motion to intervene and 
then proceeding to questions related to confidentiality orders); United Nuclear 
Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding the 
district court’s decision to allow intervention to challenge a protective order 
before clarifying other issues); see also, e.g., 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 26.106 (3d ed. 1997) (“The correct procedure for a nonparty 
to challenge a protective order is a motion to intervene in the action in which 
the protective order was issued.”); 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2044.1 
(stating that “granting intervention does not imply that the protect order will be 
modified, but provides only that the intervenor may be heard on that subject”). 
 137. See 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 136, ¶ 26.106 (outlining the standards 
and factors courts use to decide whether to modify an order).  
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The standards to modify protective orders are in apparent 
disarray, and even vary within the same jurisdiction, depending 
on the party who is seeking to modify and the circumstances 
under which the order was entered.138 Courts modify stipulated 
umbrella orders more liberally than other protective orders 
because no particularized good cause showing is made when an 
umbrella order is entered.139 Likewise, collateral litigants who 
seek to modify protective orders to gain access to discovery 
materials for use in their own cases often face a less onerous 
standard than third-party media or public interest litigants who 
seek access to disseminate discovery materials to the broader 
public.140 
In addition, a circuit split persists even on the standard to 
allow access for collateral litigants.141 The division among 
modifying courts stems from the competing Rule 1 concerns 
conjured by discovery sharing.142  
On one hand, protective orders supposedly grease the wheels 
of litigation by ensuring secrecy—so long as parties can rely on 
protective orders being enforced over the long term.143 
                                                                                                     
 138. See id. (discussing the multitude of standards that courts apply, 
depending on the situation, to determine whether to modify a protective order). 
 139. See San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 
1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Such blanket orders are inherently subject to challenge 
and modification, as the party resisting disclosure generally has not made a 
particularized showing of good cause with respect to any individual document.”).  
 140. Cf., e.g., 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 136, ¶ 26.106 (generalizing that 
most courts favor avoiding duplicative discovery and allow a collateral litigant 
to access discovery protected by a protective order). 
 141. See 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2044.1 (comparing the Second 
Circuit’s “very restrictive attitude” regarding a modification with the Seventh 
Circuit’s functional approach to allowing access). 
 142. See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(observing that Rule 1 efficiency concerns weigh in favor of modification for use 
of discovery in collateral litigation), superseded by rule as stated in Bond v. 
Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009); cf. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 775 N.W.2d 
302, 311 (Iowa 2009) (weighing a party’s legitimate interest in confidentiality 
against systemic benefits of protective-order modification); see also, 8A WRIGHT 
ET AL., supra note 16, § 2044.1 (noting that courts confronted with protective 
orders have choices between concerns grounded in Rule 1).  
 143. See SEC v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 230 (2d Cir. 2001 (“If 
protective orders were easily modified, moreover, parties would be less 
forthcoming in giving testimony and less willing to settle their disputes.”); cf. 
 
2212 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2014) 
On the other hand, refusing to modify nonsharing protective 
orders prevents similarly situated litigants from sharing already 
produced discovery, forcing each new case to engage in 
unnecessary re-discovery of the same information.144 The current 
circuit split reflects this tension. 
Valuing party reliance over the benefits of sharing, the 
Second Circuit often requires “extraordinary circumstances” to 
modify existing protective orders.145 In Martindell v. 
International Telephone,146 the district court denied a government 
request to modify a protective order, a request that would have 
given the government access to depositions from a civil case for 
use in a related criminal prosecution.147 The Second Circuit 
affirmed, holding that courts should modify protective orders only 
on “a showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c) 
protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or 
compelling need.”148 
To be sure, Martindell’s holding should be construed more 
narrowly than it often is.149 The actual discovery information at 
issue comprised depositions of witnesses who relied on the 
                                                                                                     
Marcus, supra note 10, at 485 (noting that lack of protective order creating 
“general public access would tend to disrupt the cooperative exchange of 
discovery”). 
 144. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (“Allowing the fruits of one litigation to facilitate preparation in other 
cases advances the interests of judicial economy by avoiding the wasteful 
duplication of discovery.”). 
 145. See Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 
1979) (requiring “extraordinary circumstance or compelling need” to modify 
protective order); see also, e.g., In re Sept. 11 Litig., 262 F.R.D. 274, 277 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[P]laintiff seeking to modify a protective order [must] show 
improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary 
circumstance or compelling need.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 146. 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 147. See id. at 293 (denying the government’s modification request because 
deposition testimony had been given in reliance on the protective order). 
 148. Id. at 296 (emphasis added). 
 149. See, e.g., SEC v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 299 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Though Martindell did involve a Government request to modify a protective 
order, its logic is not restricted to Government requests, nor did our opinion in 
Martindell suggest otherwise.”). 
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protective order to not invoke their Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination.150  
An easy modification would have discouraged similarly 
situated witnesses from cooperating in discovery in the future—
creating just the type of inefficiency Rule 1 will not brook. So the 
circuit court put its thumb on the side of protecting reliance 
interests, declining to find “extraordinary circumstances” and 
refusing to modify the order. 
Most circuits have taken a more liberal approach to 
modifying protective orders. In an oft-cited case, Wilk v. American 
Medical Ass’n,151 the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the 
extraordinary circumstances test.152 Instead, the case announced 
a presumption in favor of modifications to allow discovery 
sharing.153 But when parties opposed to discovery sharing can 
demonstrate prejudice flowing from the modification, according to 
Wilk, courts should employ a balancing test to weigh the benefits 
of discovery sharing against that prejudice.154  
This approach reasonably addresses the Rule 1 tensions 
described. Parties’ actual reliance interests are considered and 
protected to ensure that protective orders maintain the teeth 
necessary to encourage full cooperation in discovery. At the same 
time, the test operates under a presumption in favor of the well-
known benefits of discovery sharing.155  
                                                                                                     
 150. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 293 (denying the government’s modification 
request because deposition testimony had been given in reliance on the 
protective order, rendering the reliance on the Fifth Amendment unnecessary by 
the witnesses). 
 151. 635 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1980), superseded by rule as stated in Bond v. 
Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 152. See id. at 1299–1300 (forgoing the extraordinary circumstance standard 
in favor of the presumption that pretrial discovery must take place in public). 
 153. See id. (holding that when a modification of a protective order can place 
private litigants in a position they would otherwise reach only after repetitious 
discovery, courts should only deny the modification when it would prejudice 
substantial rights of the party opposing modification). 
 154. See id. at 1299 (instructing courts to determine whether the injury to 
the party opposing the modification outweighs the benefits of the modification). 
 155. See id. at 1299–1300 (describing the economic and efficiency benefits of 
discovery sharing). 
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III. Trends in Discovery Reform 
The court-confidentiality problem did not arise in a vacuum. 
Instead, the focus on confidentiality stems from a pretrial-
discovery regime that some contend is uniquely intrusive and 
costly.156 But the discovery status quo is soon to be affected by 
proposed rule amendments that are likely to become law.157  
These amendments have the potential to weaken the core 
rationale justifying easily obtainable confidentiality orders by 
making discovery less intrusive in certain cases. And the 
amendments’ focus on proportionality will work in tandem with 
discovery sharing to reduce discovery burdens on courts and 
litigants. 
Before examining the current proposed changes, it would be 
helpful to understand some basic milestones in the development 
of the pretrial discovery system and how they relate to the 
development of protective-order law.  
A. History 
By all accounts, the late-1930s adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure transformed litigation.158 The new rules 
introduced myriad pretrial discovery mechanisms to a system 
that traditionally relied on trial-by-surprise.159 Indeed, before the 
                                                                                                     
 156. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective 
Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010) (explaining why pretrial 
discovery has become “one of the most divisive and nettlesome issues in civil 
litigation”). 
 157. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT TO THE STANDING 
COMMITTEE, app. B-31, 10–26 (June 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014-add.pdf (outlining the proposed 
changes to Rule 26 and including the Committee’s notes explaining those 
changes).  
 158. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 16, at 12–13 (observing that the civil rules 
transformed American litigation and laid the groundwork for a period of 
American procedural “exceptionalism”). 
 159. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) 
(noting that the discovery rules make trial “less a game of blind man’s buff and 
more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest 
practice”); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (“[C]ivil trials in the 
federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, 
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civil rules, parties had almost no opportunity for pretrial 
discovery, with a few limited exceptions.160 
The hope behind these changes was that pretrial discovery 
would enhance the quality of fact-finding and increase efficiency 
at trial.161 Because the new rules allowed the parties to unearth a 
wide range of information in advance, trial would be narrowed to 
only those facts and issues truly in dispute.162 Likewise, trial 
would hopefully be less of a game of concealment and surprise (as 
it had traditionally been) and more of a search for the truth.163 
The introduction of pretrial discovery also complemented the 
civil rules’ notice pleading standards. Before the rules, pleading 
was onerous—parties were required to state claims and defenses 
in exacting factual detail.164 The new pleading rules reduced this 
burden, requiring only that parties plead in a general form giving 
the opposing side notice of claims and defenses.165 In the new 
notice pleading system, parties could no longer rely on the 
complaint or the answer to learn the factual basis of the other 
side’s claim. Rather, parties would get notice of the claims via the 
pleadings and rely on discovery to uncover the facts.166 
                                                                                                     
consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest 
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial [through discovery].”). 
 160. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501 (noting the “cumbersome” and “narrowly 
confined” pre-rules discovery processes); see also 8 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (3d ed. 2010) (describing the means by which 
parties conducted pretrial discovery prior to the rules as “very limited”). 
 161. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical 
Background of the 1938 Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 725–26 (1998) 
(emphasizing that the changes to pretrial discovery would improve efficiency at 
trial and prevent surprises). 
 162. See, e.g., Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501 (proclaiming that the new rules 
enabled parties to “clarify the basic issues between [them]” before trial). 
 163. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 682 (noting that trial would 
become “more of a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the 
fullest practicable extent”). 
 164. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500 (noting that before the civil rules, “the 
pre-trial functions of notice-giving issue-formulation and fact-revelation were 
performed primarily and inadequately by the pleadings”). 
 165. See id. at 501 (interpreting the new rules to require the pleadings only 
to give notice to the opposing side). 
 166. See id. (stating that the “deposition-discovery process” now has “a vital 
role in the preparation for trial”). In recent years, the Supreme Court has 
revisited this notice pleading standard, requiring some degree of factual 
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The breadth of information parties could seek in discovery 
grew for decades.167 Indeed, under the new regime parties were 
entitled to all relevant, nonprivileged information in the 
possession of any person.168 This reversed a long-standing court 
aversion to pretrial “fishing expeditions.”169  
This procedural expansion accompanied a substantive 
expansion, and some would say “litigation boom,” in American 
courts.170 The advent of products liability litigation, the 
concurrent expansion of tort liability, and the explosion of civil 
rights litigation transformed the substantive legal landscape 
during the 1950s and 1960s.171 
In 1970, amendments to the civil rules set the high water 
mark for broad discovery.172 But during the ensuing decade, the 
tide in favor of liberal discovery procedure began to change.173 By 
the late 1970s, commentators and courts began rumbling for 
                                                                                                     
specificity in pleading. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting 
that the pleading standard in Rule 8 does not require detailed factual 
allegations but requires more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 
(reemphasizing that Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement that 
gives the defendant fair notice); see also Dustin B. Benham, Twombly and Iqbal 
Should (Finally!) Put the Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud Out 
of Its Misery, 64 SMU L. REV. 649, 678 (2011) (interpreting Iqbal and Twombly 
to require a party to plead specific factual allegations as to make a claim for 
relief plausible). 
 167. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 2011 (noting the shift in 
perspective by the Supreme Court, deciding that discovery fishing expeditions 
are acceptable). 
 168. See id. (stating that “a party is not required to have the affirmative of 
the issue upon which he seeks discovery”).  
 169. See Subrin, supra note 161, at 743–45 (chronicling the Advisory 
Committee debates during the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and observing that the rule drafters largely chose not to include restraints 
against fishing expeditions).  
 170. See Marcus, supra note 16, at 13 (referring to the mid-century 
transformation of American litigation as a product of both the procedural and 
substantive developments in American law). 
 171. See id. (listing the various growths in certain areas of law that 
contributed to the shifting legal landscape). 
 172. See id. (noting that the amendments to the rules benefited plaintiffs by 
making it easier to obtain proof and increase damages awards). 
 173. See id. at 14 (referencing the shift in the attitude regarding discovery 
as “a recoil”). 
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change.174 At around the same time, the relationship between the 
breadth of discovery materials and the proper use of discovery 
materials (i.e., discovery confidentiality) became a battleground 
in the war against what many viewed as an out-of-control 
litigation system.175  
It comes as no surprise that following the explosion of 
pretrial discovery and the substantive bases of recovery during 
the 50s and 60s, questions about the use of litigation information 
hit the forefront.176 Parties increasingly sought to avoid 
responding to discovery altogether through a wave of suspect 
boilerplate objections.177 At the same time, parties resisting 
discovery sought to limit dissemination of an increasingly broad 
swath of litigation information protective orders.178 In response, 
other parties chafed under what they viewed as undue 
                                                                                                     
 174. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 
(1975) (describing the discovery procedures as “liberal,” “extensive,” “a social 
cost rather than a benefit,” and “a threat”). 
 175. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 2001 (reiterating the courts’ 
growing concern over the “abuse of discovery” by plaintiffs). 
 176. See, e.g., James P. Moon, In re San Juan Star: Discovery and the First 
Amendment, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 229, 232–33 (1982) (discussing the balancing act 
between a plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free speech and a defendant’s 
right to a fair trial); Susan M. Angele, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders and the First 
Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1654 (1980) (evaluating the competing 
interests in suppression and dissemination of discovered information during 
litigation); Michael Dore, Confidentiality Orders—The Proper Role of the Courts 
in Providing Confidential Treatment for Information Disclosed Through the Pre-
trial Discovery Process, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 3 (1978) (acknowledging that 
“courts recognized the inherent danger that material disclosed during the course 
of litigation might be used for adverse collateral purposes”); see also Marcus, 
supra note 2, at 4 n.25 (recognizing the constitutional limitations on the power 
of courts to enter protective orders). 
 177. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that “the intrusiveness and 
burdensome nature of discovery is the most cited objection to the litigation 
boom”). 
 178. According to some pro-transparency advocates of the time, the 
confidentiality problem approached epidemic proportions. See HARE, JR. ET AL., 
supra note 84, at 1–6 (describing the “hidden agenda” of a motion for a 
protective order, which includes isolating the plaintiff’s attorney from 
consultation with other lawyers handling similar cases); cf. HARE, JR. ET AL., 
supra note 85, at 157–62 (indicating that protective orders frequently prevent 
plaintiffs from collaborating and result in stonewalling).  
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restrictions and aggressively litigated to obtain discovery and 
disseminate it widely.179 
According to some commentators reflecting on that time, the 
American litigation system of the time had become uniquely 
“threatening” among the world’s systems.180 But by the early 
1980s, the tide turned against broad discovery, if not against 
stonewalling by parties to avoid producing responsive 
information. Reform has been incremental, many would contend 
too slow.181 In 1980, amendments to the discovery rules were 
adopted, and three Justices dissented on the ground that the 
amendments did not go far enough to curb out-of-control 
discovery.182  
Another package of discovery-reform amendments was 
adopted in 1983.183 These amendments deleted a sentence in Rule 
26 that seemed to permit unlimited discovery.184 The changes also 
gave judges more tools to combat perceived excesses in discovery, 
including a provision that specifically allowed judges to consider 
whether discovery was proportional to the case.185  
Simultaneously, the confidentiality fight raged on—Seattle 
Times Co. v. Rhinehart186 was argued and decided in the spring of 
                                                                                                     
 179. See Dore, supra note 176, at 3 (describing the manner in which litigants 
can, with very limited restraints, demand information during discovery). 
 180. See Marcus, supra note 16, at 13 (quoting a federal judge in saying, “[a] 
foreigner watching the discovery proceedings in a civil suit would never suspect 
that this country has a highly-prized tradition of privacy”).  
 181. See id. at 17 (“[I]t’s hard to deny that many argue that U.S. procedure 
is not functioning as one would want it to function.”). 
 182. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 
521, 521 (1980) (“[T]he changes embodied in the amendments fall short of those 
needed to accomplish reforms in civil litigation that are long overdue.”). 
 183. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 
165, 171–72 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Amendments] (updating Rule 26 to reflect 
changes in the general provisions governing discovery). 
 184. Former Rule 26(a) read, “Unless the court orders otherwise under 
subdivision (c) of this rule, the frequency of use of these methods is not limited.” 
Id.; see also 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 2008.1 (outlining the changes 
made to Rule 26). 
 185. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (permitting the court to sua sponte 
limit discovery after conducting a cost–benefit analysis); 1983 Amendments, 
supra note 183, at 172 (discussing the scope of discovery).  
 186. 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
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1984. Thus the Court tightened the discovery rules187 and 
affirmed the role of pretrial-discovery confidentiality in less than 
one year.188 According to the Seattle Times Court, discovery was 
still very broad and litigants still needed protection from broad 
dissemination of discovery materials, notwithstanding the 
amendments.189 
The Court turned out to be prescient—within a few decades 
of the first discovery-reform amendments, many commentators 
concluded that the changes, particularly the proportionality 
amendment, had not been effective in substantially narrowing 
discovery.190 And despite continued efforts at reform through the 
1990s and early 2000s, at least some still contend that the costs 
of discovery, in terms of both privacy and money, are out of 
proportion with the benefits.191 
B. Current Proposal 
In May 2010, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
convened a two-day conference at Duke Law School to discuss 
potential solutions to various civil procedure problems.192 
Academics, judges, and attorneys from around the country 
gathered to exchange ideas, some of which were quite 
contentious.193 Interestingly, protective orders were effectively a 
                                                                                                     
 187. See 1983 Amendments, supra note 183, at 172 (limiting the scope of 
discovery). 
 188. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33 (noting that pretrial discovery should 
not be a “public component” of a civil trial). 
 189. See id. at 36 (“The unique character of the discovery process requires 
that the trial court have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.”); see 
also 1983 Amendments, supra note 183, at 172 (“Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved. . . .”). 
 190. See Jordan M. Singer, Proportionality’s Cultural Foundation, 52 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 145, 148 (2012) (noting that the amendments had “virtually no 
impact” on the expansive nature of discovery).  
 191. See Marcus, supra note 16, at 17 (stating that “the notion that 
American litigation is too costly and time-consuming has gained much force”). 
 192. See id. (describing the conference at Duke Law that dealt with highly 
contentious subjects related to the Civil Rules). 
 193. See id. (detailing the participants that attended the conference and 
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non-issue at the conference, meriting only a passing mention 
among contributors.194 Instead, the majority of attention focused 
on the rules governing pleading and discovery, with an emphasis 
on active judicial case management and party cooperation.195  
Following the conference, the Advisory Committee spent 
three years considering the ideas and ultimately proposed several 
amendments to the civil rules in the fall of 2013.196 Echoing 
concerns raised at the conference, the proposed amendments 
targeted discovery practices. 
The original Advisory Committee Proposal would have 
amended rules to take some of the teeth out of the sanctions for 
failing to preserve evidence; lower the presumptive limits on the 
number of interrogatories, depositions, and requests for 
admission; require enhanced and accelerated case management; 
reaffirm proportionality’s role in the scope of discovery; and 
encourage party cooperation through changes to Rule 1.197  
After a public comment period during the spring of 2014, the 
Advisory Committee withdrew its changes to the presumptive 
numerical discovery limits.198 It also substantially revised 
                                                                                                     
what they discussed).  
 194. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 5 (2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Li
brary/Report%20to%20the%20Chief%20Justice.pdf [hereinafter REPORT TO THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE] (stating that “protective-order provisions of Rule 26(c) drew no 
comment or attention at all, other than suggestions for standardizing protective 
orders for categories of litigation”). But see Seymour Moskowitz, What Federal 
Lawmakers Can Learn from State Procedural Innovations, 2010 Conference on 
Civil Litig. (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/ 
Duke%20Materials/Library/Seymour%20Moskowitz,%20What%20Federal%20R
ulemakers%20Can%20Learn%20From%20State.pdf (discussing litigation 
secrecy and secrecy reform).  
 195. See REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 194, at 5 (“Pleading and 
discovery dominated Conference suggestions for rule amendments.”). 
 196. See Marcus, supra note 16, at 17 (describing the process that the 
Advisory Committee took to propose amendments to the civil rules).  
 197. See SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON 
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 23 (2013), http://www.uscourts. 
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2013.pdf (describing the 
purposes of the changes to Rule 1).  
 198. See Tera E. Brostoff & Jeffrey D. Koelmay, E-Discovery Rules Gets 
Late-Night Rewrite, Advisory Committee Approves Rules Package, 82 U.S.L.W. 
 
PROPORTIONALITY, PRETRIAL CONFIDENTIALITY 2221 
proposed language in Rule 37 that would have changed the 
threshold to sanction spoliation.199 The comment period also 
resulted in tweaks to the language of the remaining proposed rule 
changes.200 
On May 29, 2014, the Standing Committee on the Rules of 
Practice and Procedure approved the Advisory Committee’s 
proposal.201 The Judicial Conference voted on the Standing 
Committee’s recommendation in the fall, putting the proposal 
before the Supreme Court.202 If the Court adopts the Judicial 
Conference’s recommendation, the amendments will become law 
in December 2015, absent unlikely Congressional action. 
All of the amendments in the Duke Package aim to increase 
efficiency and reducing unnecessary, wasteful discovery and 
discovery litigation.203 But changes to the discovery-scope 
provisions, in particular, merit discussion because of their close 
relationship to court confidentiality. 
The proposed amendments would explicitly limit the scope of 
discovery in Rule 26(b)(1) to only that which is proportional to the 
case.204 To determine what is “proportional,” courts should 
                                                                                                     
1549 (Apr. 14, 2014) (indicating that public comments contributed to the 
Committee’s decision to withdraw its changes to the numerical discovery limits). 
 199. See id. (describing the unpublished language of Rule 37 as “greatly 
simplified”). 
 200. For instance, the Advisory Committee reordered the proportionality 
factors to make “the importance of the issues at stake” first in the list. See 
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 68 (describing the rearrangement of the 
factors). It also added “parties’ relative access to relevant information” to the list 
of factors. Id.; see also Brostoff & Koelmay, supra note 198 (emphasizing the 
importance of the comment period on the Advisory Committee’s final proposal). 
 201. Brostoff, supra note 6.  
 202. Judicial Conference Receives Budget Update, Forwards Rules Package 
to Supreme Court, THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://news.uscourts.gov/judicial-conference-receives-budget-update-forwards-
rules-package-supreme-court (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 203. See SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON 
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 197, at 18 (“The proposed rules 
amendments are aimed at reducing the costs and delays in civil litigation, 
increasing realistic access to the courts, and furthering the goals of Rule 1 ‘to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.’”).  
 204. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 80 (“Parties may obtain 
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consider the importance of the issues at stake, the amount in 
controversy, the parties’ relative access to sources of proof, the 
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving 
the issues, and whether the burden of the discovery outweighs its 
likely benefit.205 Thus, under the proposal, proportionality—first 
introduced in a less-prominent form in the 1983 amendments to 
Rule 26206—would take center stage in setting the scope of 
discovery.  
In their current form, the Rules require courts to consider 
proportionality to limit discovery requests that are otherwise 
within the permissible scope of Rule 26(b)(1) but nevertheless 
impose a disproportionate burden.207 Current Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–
(iii) allows courts to limit burdensome discovery, particularly 
when its costs outweigh potential benefits to the case.208 For 
instance, courts may consider whether discovery is “cumulative” 
or “duplicative” or obtainable from a less-burdensome source.209 
Likewise, courts must consider the needs of the case and the 
importance of the issues when weighing the burdens imposed by 
discovery.210 
                                                                                                     
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s 
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”).  
 205. See id. (stating these factors should be considered when determining 
the proportionality of the scope of discovery).  
 206. See 1983 Amendments, supra note 183, at 217 (incorporating 
proportionality into Rule 26, albeit not in the rule’s primary scope 
provision). 
 207. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), (b)(2)(C)(iii) (mandating courts “limit 
the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by 
local rule if it determines that . . . the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit”). 
 208. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(iii) (“On motion or on its own, the 
court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by 
these rules or by local rule if it determines that . . . the burden or expense of 
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of 
the case . . . .”). 
 209. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i) (requiring courts to limit the extent 
of discovery if “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive”). 
 210. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (listing the following factors to be 
considered by courts when deciding whether to limit discovery: “[T]he needs of the 
case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of 
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The proposed amendments to Rule 26 would promote the 
proportionality analysis to the primary scope provision of 
26(b)(1).211 Currently, attorneys are expected to exercise 
discretion to frame discovery requests within the scope allowed 
by Rule 26(b)(1),212 and if they fail to do so, opposing counsel can 
request limitations, or protections, from the court.213 Likewise, 
current rule 26(g) mandates that attorneys who sign discovery 
requests certify that the requests are, among other things, 
proportional.214 If necessary, the court then exercises its 
discretion to refine discovery along those same lines.215  
The amendments, however, would emphasize attorneys’ 
obligation to consider what is proportional when they exercise 
their discretion to frame discovery requests in the first place.216 
                                                                                                     
the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues”). 
 211. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 80 (defining the “scope in 
general” as “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense and proportional to the needs of the case”). 
 212. Under the 2000 amendments, attorneys have discretion to frame 
requests relevant to any claim or defense of a party—a slightly narrower subset 
of information than information relevant to the “subject matter of the action” 
previously allowed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (explaining 
the ramifications of allowing the prior broad scope of discovery, for instance, 
“parties seek to justify discovery requests that sweep far beyond the claims and 
defenses of the parties on the ground that they nevertheless have a bearing on 
the ‘subject matter’ involved in the action”). Now, courts are given the discretion 
to allow discovery relevant to the subject matter of the action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(1) (permitting courts to widen the scope of discovery in this manner “for 
good cause”); see also Singer, supra note 190, at 176–80 (discussing the shift 
away from attorney discretion and toward judicial discretion in limiting pretrial 
discovery). 
 213. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), (c) (setting forth limitations on discovery in 
subsection (b) and the protocol concerning motions for protective orders in 
subsection (c)). 
 214. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (requiring attorneys to affirm their requests 
are “neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the 
needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action”). 
 215. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (allowing the court to limit the extent 
of discovery when it determines “the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit”). 
 216. Cf. Singer, supra note 190, at 176–80 (noting the risks associated with 
placing undue emphasis on attorneys’ discretion in discovery).  
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The potential real-world impact of the proposed change is 
subject to fierce debate. Over 2,300 public comments were filed 
during the six-month comment period, some in favor of the 
proposal, some opposed, and some hoping the Committee would 
go further in limiting discovery.217  
The Advisory Committee contends, contrary to many 
comments, that defining the scope of discovery around the 
proportionality concept merely reflects what is already in the 
rule.218 According to the committee, the change “reinforces” 
attorneys’ proportionality obligations.219 This reinforcement is 
apparently necessary because many courts and attorneys were 
not adhering to the proportionality concept when tailoring 
discovery.220 
At a minimum, the changes could prompt a wave of discovery 
disputes based on allegations that discovery requests are not 
proportional to the case. Reacting to the re-crafted scope 
provision, litigants and courts will undoubtedly pay more heed to 
proportionality.221 
Taken together, the amendments, combined with continued 
criticism of what some view as overbroad discovery, may create 
momentum in some courts to narrow the scope of discovery 
significantly, at least as a practical matter.222 For some 
                                                                                                     
 217. See Brostoff & Koelmay, supra note 198 (explaining, in response to this 
issue, “Rule 26(b)(1) was modified before the public comment period so that 
proportionality is now explicitly brought up early in the rule in the section 
addressing scope of discovery”). 
 218. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 84 (asserting that “[r]estoring 
the proportionality calculation to Rule 26(b)(1) does not change the existing 
responsibilities of the court and the parties to consider proportionality”). 
 219. See id. (listing obligations such as considering proportionality “in 
making discovery requests, responses, or objections”).  
 220. See id. at 82–83 (noting that “district judges have been reluctant to 
limit the use of the discovery devices” as originally intended). 
 221. The proposed amendment would also delete the phrase, “[r]elevant 
information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” from Rule 26’s scope 
provision. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 70. The impact of such a change 
is not clear, but some on the Advisory Committee contend that the phrase “was 
never intended to expand the scope of discovery.” Brostoff & Koelmay, supra 
note 198. 
 222. See, e.g., 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, §§ 2008, 2008.1 (describing 
the modest impact of the discovery-scope amendments during the period from 
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commentators, the changes are a tepid step toward international 
litigation norms.223 Some in practice describe the potential 
change as almost cataclysmic.224 The truth is probably 
somewhere in the middle—the scope amendments will 
substantially narrow discovery in some cases but will not, as 
predicted by some, end pretrial litigation as we currently know 
it.225 
Narrowing the scope of discovery may create efficiency in 
some cases. Avoiding wasteful re-discovery in similar cases would 
undoubtedly create efficiency in a wide swath of complex cases.226 
While the rule makers have chosen to focus on scope, courts 
should turn their attention toward a unified approach to sharing. 
Doing so would work in tandem with the proposed amendments. 
The next Part examines the relationship between sharing and 
proportionality and proposes some baseline sharing-protective-
order principles. 
IV. A Framework for Discovery Sharing 
Courts and commentators are divided on the propriety of 
discovery sharing and how best to accomplish it.227 The federal 
                                                                                                     
1980–2000). 
 223. See Marcus, supra note 16, at 23–24 (“From the perspective of the rest 
of the world, this package of changes is likely to seem very modest, perhaps 
minimal.”).  
 224. See, e.g., Letter from Paul W. Mollica, to the Comm. on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, at 1 (Feb. 13, 2014) 
[S]everal proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure will deprive litigants of the promise of the American 
adversary process as the best means of ascertaining the truth and 
minimizing error. Rather, they will front-load federal civil cases with 
prefabricated conflicts that will disrupt orderly litigation and detract 
from truth-finding.  
(internal quotations and citations omitted) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 225. See Singer, supra note 190, at 149 (outlining the important roles that 
attorney discretion and behavior play in achieving proportionality within the 
discovery process). 
 226. See discussion supra Part III(C)(i) (discussing the positive impact of 
sharing in products-liability cases). 
 227. See cases cited supra note 5 (demonstrating varying preferences among 
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civil rules are silent on sharing, forcing courts to implement ad 
hoc processes within the glow of Rule 26(c) ’s “good cause” 
standard.228 Courts, grasping in the dark for a framework, 
sometimes deny requests for perfectly acceptable upfront 
sharing provisions in protective orders.229 In other instances, 
courts may deny a request to modify a nonsharing protective 
order to allow for sharing, following an out-of-touch 
modification standard that imposes an unnecessarily onerous 
burden.230 
Hostility toward discovery sharing is contrary to both the 
spirit of the Duke Conference and the goals of the proposed 
civil amendments.231 This Part proposes three basic discovery-
sharing principles and considers their interaction with current 
law and the proposed amendments to Rule 26. 
                                                                                                     
courts concerning discovery-sharing provisions); cf. Marcus, supra note 2, at 43 
(arguing that a third-party litigant seeking access to discovery in cases to which 
he is not a party should “demonstrate that he would have the right to obtain 
them,” presumably in a modification proceeding); Campbell, supra note 2, at 824 
(“[I]n the long run information sharing may actually waste judicial time and 
resources.”); Timmins, supra note 92, at 1543 (“[I]nformation sharing avoids 
duplicitous discovery while maintaining the secrecy required for the defendant’s 
competitive interests.”). 
 228. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(g) (outlining when courts may “for good 
cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense”); see also Parsons v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (“The federal rules do 
not foreclose collaboration among litigants.”); Campbell, supra note 2, at 827 
(“[I]nformation-sharing, while perhaps generally consistent with the directive of 
Rule 1, at least when shared with other plaintiffs, is not specifically authorized 
by the Rules.”). 
 229. See, e.g., Williams v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0051-RWS, 2006 WL 
1835437, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006) (denying request for sharing provision 
in protective order). 
 230. Knitting Fever, Inc. v. Coats Holdings Ltd., No. CV05-
1065(DRH)(WDW), 2011 WL 3678823, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) (relying 
on Martindell’s extraordinary circumstances test to deny a request to modify a 
protective order). 
 231. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 65–66 (“A principal conclusion 
of the Duke conference was that discovery in civil litigation would more often 
achieve the goal of Rule 1—the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action—through an increased emphasis on proportionality.”). 
PROPORTIONALITY, PRETRIAL CONFIDENTIALITY 2227 
A. Upfront Sharing Provisions Versus Later Modification 
In most circumstances, upfront sharing provisions should 
be favored over later ad hoc intervention and modification 
requests. This principle has its root in Rule 26(c) ’s good cause 
requirement and operates within trial courts ’ well-established 
zone of protective-order discretion.232 In most cases implicating 
discovery-sharing concerns, evidence of good cause simply will 
not support a protective order that forbids sharing at the 
outset.233 To establish good cause for a protective order, the 
party requesting the order must establish both that the 
information it seeks to protect is confidential and that failure 
to enter the order will result in substantial and serious 
harm.234 The terms of the protective order should be no broader 
than necessary to protect the requesting party from such 
harm.235  
The typical harm advanced by parties seeking protective 
orders is economic or proprietary injury flowing from 
dissemination of discovery information to competitors.236 
Protective orders that allow sharing prevent this harm in two 
                                                                                                     
 232. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (“The court may, for good cause, issue an order 
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense.”); Timmins, supra note 92, at 1507 (“After finding 
good cause, the court must then evaluate each of the countervailing concerns to 
determine whether the court should use the court’s discretion to grant a 
protective order.”). 
 233. See 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 2035 (recognizing that specific 
evidence of harm must support entry of an audience-limiting protective order).  
 234. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 149 F.3d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1998) (“To obtain a 
protective order under Rule 26(c), the party resisting discovery must establish 
that the information sought is covered by the rule and that it will be harmed by 
disclosure.”); Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien BIAO Bank Tanz. Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 
143 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that the party must show “clearly defined and very 
serious injury” to obtain protective order). 
 235. See Small v. Ramsey, 280 F.R.D. 264, 269 (N.D.W. Va. 2012) (stating 
that the moving party “must demonstrate that the discovery sought lacks 
relevance ‘to the extent that the likelihood and severity of the harm or 
injury . . . outweighs any need for the information’”). 
 236. See, e.g., Petersen v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 1:06 CV 00108 TC 
PMW, 2007 WL 914738, at *1 (D. Utah Mar. 5, 2007) (stating that failure to 
enter protective order would result in “harmful disclosure of confidential and 
proprietary information”). 
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ways. First, the orders typically include a provision that 
expressly forbids giving the information to the producing 
party’s competitors, and violations are punishable by 
contempt.237 Second, the sharing provision itself could be 
narrowly tailored to allow for sharing only with cases 
involving a strong factual similarity to the case in which the 
order is entered.238 Excluding competitors from the sharing 
class obviates the most likely (and often only) cognizable 
source of harm flowing from the disclosure of discovery 
information.239 
Many courts continue to enter nonsharing orders, even in 
the face of sharing requests.240 The reasoning for doing so 
varies, but a common trend has been for courts, particularly 
federal courts, to deny upfront sharing provisions in favor of 
requiring litigants in similar cases to intervene and modify a 
nonsharing protective order.241 Not only is this approach at 
                                                                                                     
 237. Cf., e.g., Pincheira v. Allstate Ins. Co., 190 P.3d 322, 337 (N.M. 2008) 
(“Ordinarily a protective order should permit discovery sharing among other 
litigants and witnesses, who are not competitors of the defendant. . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 238. Cf., e.g., Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 885, 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that, under the terms of a sharing 
protective order, “plaintiff’s attorney may share this discovery only with counsel 
in other similar cases, it must be assumed that the information is also 
discoverable in these other similar cases”). 
 239. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 774 (noting that the dissemination of 
discovery information means “[c]ompetitors will then have ready access to the 
company’s internal decision-making procedures and to other highly sensitive 
information”). 
 240. See, e.g., Menendez ex rel. Menendez v. Wal-Mart Stores E. LP, No. 
1:10-CV-53, 2012 WL 90140, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 11, 2012) (denying request for 
sharing order and finding that “any purported gain in judicial efficiency 
achieved in other cases through ‘sharing orders’ is purely hypothetical” in case). 
 241. See, e.g., Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc., No. CV-09-2209-PHX-
DGC, 2010 WL 1740831, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (holding that sharing 
provision would circumvent required modification procedure); Petersen v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 1:06 CV 00108 TC PMW, 2007 WL 914738, at *1 (D. 
Utah Mar. 5, 2007) 
The court is not persuaded that the inclusion of [a sharing] provision 
is either appropriate or necessary. Such sharing requests can and 
should be considered on an ‘as-needed’ basis throughout the course of 
the litigation, rather than ‘opening the barn doors’ with a broad order 
at this stage, which is anything but “protective.” 
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odds with Rule 26(c)’s requirement that the breadth of a 
protective order be supported by evidence of good cause, but it 
also imposes burdens on the system with no correlative 
benefits. 
Upfront sharing provisions are more efficient than later 
intervention and modification. First, upfront sharing 
provisions reduce litigation about discovery.242 When properly 
crafted, discovery-sharing provisions avoid satellite discovery 
disputes by allowing parties to share discovery without any 
further court intervention.243 In contrast, each litigant who 
seeks to share in already completed discovery in a case 
governed by a nonsharing order must intervene and file a 
motion to modify the order.244 This process not only 
discourages litigants from utilizing shared discovery in the 
first place but also creates an unnecessary discovery 
dispute.245 
These disputes often arise from a requirement in some 
courts that parties seeking to modify a protective order 
demonstrate that the information they seek through sharing 
                                                                                                     
 242. See Singer, supra note 190, at 166–67 (describing a 2009 “study of 
closed civil cases by the Federal Judicial Center, 63.8% of plaintiffs’ attorneys 
and 61% of defense attorneys agreed that the parties in their cases ‘were able to 
reduce the cost and burden [of the named case] of discovery through 
cooperation.’”). 
 243. See, e.g., Kamp Implement Co., v. J.I. Case Co., 630 F. Supp. 218, 220 
(D. Mont. 1986) (“If defendants’ proposed [nonsharing] order were entered, the 
court would be faced with motions by litigants in other cases for modification of 
the order to allow the information to be released to them. This would result in 
duplication of time and effort in each instance where discovery is sought.”); cf., 
e.g., Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982) (“Each plaintiff 
should not have to undertake to discover anew the basic evidence that other 
plaintiffs have uncovered.”). 
 244. See, e.g., Long, 2010 WL 1740831, at *1 (stating that collateral litigants 
“should not be granted automatic access to a defendant’s confidential 
documents” and must “go through the appropriate steps to obtain that 
discovery”). 
 245. This effect proves counter to the scope and purpose of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (asserting the Rules “should be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding”). 
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is discoverable in their own case.246 The approach is rooted in 
comity concerns and concerns about forum shopping.247  
Indeed, several courts have resisted sharing orders on the 
ground that sharing provisions have the potential to thwart 
the discovery limitations of the jurisdictions in which 
litigants receive shared information.248 According to this line 
of reasoning, crafty litigants stuck in a jurisdiction with 
limited discovery could find a similar case with a sharing 
order in a jurisdiction with more liberal discovery standards. 
By doing so, the litigant might obtain information to which he 
or she would not otherwise be entitled. Accordingly, some 
courts deny sharing requests in favor of litigant-by-litigant 
modification.249 
This process and the reasoning underlying it are flawed for 
several reasons. Even if an upfront sharing provision ignores 
discovery limitations in a collateral case, it does not harm the 
                                                                                                     
 246. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 43 (arguing that third-party litigant 
seeking to modify protective order should establish that “he would have the 
right to obtain” discovery in collateral action); 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, 
§ 2044.1 (“If the limitation on discovery in the collateral litigation would be 
substantially subverted by allowing access to discovery material under a 
protective order, the court should be inclined to deny modification.”); cf. Foltz v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he 
collateral litigant must demonstrate the relevance of the protected discovery to 
the collateral proceedings and its general discoverability therein. Requiring a 
showing of relevance prevents collateral litigants from gaining access to 
discovery materials merely to subvert limitations on discovery in another 
proceeding.”). 
 247. See, e.g., Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1133 (“Allowing the parties to the collateral 
litigation to raise specific relevance and privilege objections to the production of 
any otherwise properly protected materials in the collateral courts further 
serves to prevent the subversion of limitations on discovery in the collateral 
proceedings.”). 
 248. See, e.g., Bertetto v. Eon Labs, Inc., No. 06-1136 JCH/ACT, 2008 WL 
2522571 (D.N.M. May 29, 2008) (stating that sharing provisions would 
“potentially usurp . . . a collateral court’s role in managing discovery in a 
collateral case”); see also Cordis Corp. v. O’Shea, 988 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“Allowing this degree of sharing of confidential information 
may provide a mechanism for attorneys in states with narrower discovery laws 
to evade their state law discovery limitations . . . .”). 
 249. See, e.g., Cordis Corp., 988 So. 2d at 1167 (noting that “not every 
federal court decision has approved sharing confidential information even with 
collateral litigants or counsel”). 
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producing party in a way recognized by Rule 26(c). When 
previously produced information is shared, the producing party 
has presumably already expended resources to complete the 
discovery in the sharing jurisdiction. The collateral party 
receiving the shared information is responsible to pay to copy the 
documents.250 Moreover, the party benefiting from sharing will 
almost always be required to agree to be bound by the terms of 
the protective order (e.g., use the documents only to prepare and 
try the collateral case).251 If anything, the producing party has 
saved expense and time in the collateral case.252 The system has 
undoubtedly benefited, particularly if the party receiving the 
shared information is able to exercise her discretion better in 
framing discovery requests in the collateral case or avoid some 
requests altogether. 
Perhaps the producing party could complain that the 
collateral party received undue access to information that helped 
prove her case. But discovery limitations are meant only to 
balance the search for truth against the cost of that search, not to 
serve as a shield against liability.253 Moreover, the scope of 
discovery is necessarily broader than the standard for 
admissibility.254 If shared discovery yields relevant, admissible 
                                                                                                     
 250. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (“The conditions may 
also include payment by the requesting party of part or all of the reasonable 
costs of obtaining information from sources that are not reasonably 
accessible.”).  
 251. See Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
885, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (describing a protective order with a typical 
sharing provision, tailored to ensure compliance by counsel receiving the shared 
documents). 
 252. See Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982) 
(observing that sharing protective orders save defendant expense in time that 
would otherwise be spent on duplicative discovery in similar cases). 
 253. Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507–08 (1947) (delineating 
circumstances in discovery which could cause “the rights of individual litigants 
[to be] drained of vitality and the lawsuit [to become] more of a battle of 
deception than a search for truth”). 
 254. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing “[p]arties [to] obtain discovery 
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense” even inadmissible information). 
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evidence, the receiving jurisdiction’s trial process has been 
enhanced, not thwarted.255  
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what complaint the court in 
the receiving jurisdiction might have. If anything, the court in the 
receiving jurisdiction has had its interests furthered by the 
sharing protective order, particularly if the sharing jurisdiction 
has allowed broad discovery.256 With more proof available, 
attorneys may be less likely to engage in discovery disputes in the 
receiving jurisdiction, saving resources for that court. And more 
information, rather than less, is almost always beneficial in 
seeking truth.257 When that information comes to the collateral 
court essentially free of cost via a previously litigated case, it is 
hard to imagine the downside. 
One legitimate concern, albeit unlikely to occur often, is that 
attorneys engaged in national-scale claims might seek out a 
jurisdiction with unusually liberal discovery standards and create 
a discovery mill for other claims around the country.258 
Presumably, the attorneys could file an action, obtain favorable 
discovery rulings, obtain a sharing protective order, and then use 
the jurisdiction to feed cases around the country, notwithstanding 
the merits of the collateral sharing case. 
At the outset, there are almost no identified instances of this 
hypothetical occurring. In the event that a court had evidence of 
such a scheme, it would have ample discretion to deny a sharing 
                                                                                                     
 255. See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987) (“Shared 
discovery is an effective means to insure full and fair disclosure. Parties subject 
to a number of suits concerning the same subject matter are forced to be 
consistent in their responses by the knowledge that their opponents can 
compare those responses.”).  
 256. Cf. Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 154 (W.D. Tex. 1980) 
(“The availability of the discovery information may reduce time and money 
which must be expended in similar proceedings, and may allow for effective, 
speedy, and efficient representation.”). 
 257. See Garcia, 734 S.W.2d at 347 (“[T]he ultimate purpose of discovery is 
to seek the truth, so that disputes may be decided by what the facts reveal, not 
by what facts are concealed.”). 
 258. See Cordis Corp. v. O’Shea, 988 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2008) (warning that permitting parties to share confidential information “may 
provide a mechanism for attorneys in states with narrower discovery laws to 
evade their state law discovery limitations by obtaining confidential 
information” from a more liberal jurisdiction). 
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provision in the first place or modify an existing protective order 
to shut the discovery mill down.259 Utilizing a case primarily as a 
vehicle for obtaining information to overrun other jurisdiction’s 
discovery limitations—rather than to work toward a resolution on 
the merits—would be inappropriate.260 But the mere specter of 
such abuse does not constitute reason to abandon discovery 
sharing in favor of ad hoc modification, particularly when courts 
have ample tools to deal with any instances that do arise.261 
Nevertheless, the discoverability requirement is a predicate 
to sharing in many jurisdictions.262 As a result, parties forced to 
seek modification of protective orders may, in essence, litigate 
disputes about discoverability substantially similar to those they 
would face in their own cases. Upfront sharing provisions could 
avoid the problem altogether. 
Beyond the direct efficiencies generated by sharing 
provisions, the provisions also provide some indirect, systemic 
benefits. Indeed, up-front sharing provisions encourage party 
cooperation and efficiency in the long run by avoiding reliance 
problems and properly setting party expectations at the inception 
of protective orders.263 Later protective-order modifications often 
fall short in this regard.264 
                                                                                                     
 259. See, e.g., Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 154 (W.D. Tex. 
1980) (“Unless it can be shown that the discovering party is exploiting the 
instant litigation solely to assist litigation in a foreign forum, federal courts 
allow full use of the information in other forums.”). 
 260. See id. (highlighting the primary aim of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action”). 
 261. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (permitting courts to sanction parties for failing 
to comply with court orders); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3) (providing that a court may 
impose appropriate sanctions on a party or party’s attorney for violating the 
certification standards for discovery requests and disclosures). 
 262. See, e.g., Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc., No. CV-09-2209-PHX-
DGC, 2010 WL 1740831, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (“[T]he collateral litigant 
must demonstrate the relevance of the protected discovery to the collateral 
proceedings and its general discoverability therein.”).  
 263. See, e.g., Diversified Grp., Inc. v. Daugerdas, 217 F.R.D. 152, 158 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting one court’s “restrictive attitude toward modification of 
protective orders” and arguing that “[i]f protective orders were easily 
modified, . . . parties would be less forthcoming in giving testimony and less 
willing to settle their disputes”). 
 264. See, e.g., id. (“Where there has been reasonable reliance by a party on a 
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Courts considering protective-order modification requests 
regularly struggle with questions about reliance.265 Courts often 
hesitate to grant modifications to allow sharing after the parties 
have produced information to each other in reliance on a 
confidentiality order.266 The basis for this hesitation is that the 
parties produced the information with the expectation that it 
would be used only for the case at hand.267  
By defeating party expectations about confidentiality, so the 
logic goes, litigants will be less likely to produce information 
under protective orders in the future, causing inefficiency and 
other problems for the discovery system as a whole.268 As 
discussed in Part IV.B, this reasoning may overstate the impact 
of defeated protective order expectations. 
Whatever the true extent and impact of the reliance problem, 
sharing protective orders avoid questions about reliance 
altogether in most cases.269 When a court enters a protective 
order with a well-crafted sharing provision, all parties to the 
order know, to a large extent, who may receive information under 
                                                                                                     
protective order, a district court should not modify the order ‘absent a showing 
of improvidence in the grant of [the] order or some extraordinary circumstance 
or compelling need.’”). 
 265. See Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir. 1964) 
(noting acts committed by the defendants “in reliance upon the entry and 
continuing effectiveness of the protective orders”), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 
(1964). 
 266. See Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 293 (2d Cir. 
1979) (rejecting the Government’s modification request due to the opposing 
party’s reliance on the prior order). 
 267. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 772–75 (explaining that “[t]he number 
and variety of potential adversaries may make the ramifications of unfettered 
dissemination of discovery information overwhelming”); Marcus, supra note 2, 
at 43–44 (arguing that “a court should ordinarily deny nonparty access if all the 
parties to litigation number one oppose it, even though it may increase the 
nonparty’s expenses”). 
 268. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 772–75 (addressing potential risks to 
litigants resulting from “[t]he uncontrolled dissemination of discovery 
information among an ill-defined and untraceable amalgam of adversaries” and 
why this would lead to lessened efficiency); Marcus, supra note 2, at 43–44 
(noting that parties who foresee repeated claims may “fight discovery more 
vigorously”). 
 269. See Timmins, supra note 92, at 1520 (noting that “protective orders 
that allow information sharing can substantially reduce the burdens that the 
discovery process imposes on the plaintiff”). 
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that order. The increased certainty flowing from settled party 
expectations about litigant-to-litigant sharing may even, by itself, 
increase party willingness to provide forthright and complete 
discovery responses.270 
In sum, in many cases, particularly products-liability and 
mass tort cases, later requests from collateral litigants to modify 
protective orders are perfectly foreseeable and avoidable.271 
Courts should set reasonable party expectations by entering 
sharing protective orders that account for this reality at the 
outset.272 
For some courts, the practice of sharing privileged 
information across jurisdictions presents special difficulties. 
Privileges are often based on policy judgments meant to influence 
real-world behavior.273 They represent particular jurisdictions’ 
views on how to best maintain and further society, not simply run 
a court system.274 These policy views manifest themselves in 
privileges by limiting litigant and court access to information. 
In contrast, Rule 26(c)(1)(g) is aimed at limiting the audience 
for materials that have already been, or will be, found 
discoverable.275 The focus of the protective order rules across 
jurisdictions (largely based on Rule 26(c)) is unquestionably 
                                                                                                     
 270. See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347–48 (Tex. 1987) (explaining 
that the goals of discovery are “often frustrated by the adversarial approach to 
discovery,” and that “[s]hared discovery is an effective means to insure full and 
fair disclosure”). 
 271. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 827 (“Particularly in products liability 
cases, plaintiffs often routinely move to modify protective orders at the close of 
litigation . . . .”).  
 272. See id. at 831 (criticizing umbrella protective orders which do not 
account for this possibility). 
 273. See 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 5:2 (4th ed. 2013) (“Privilege rules occupy a unique place because 
they implement policies that are very different from those underlying other 
rules, and many privileges are broader in effect than other rules.”). 
 274. See id. (noting that privileges “are not designed to enhance the 
reliability of factfinding, and they exclude evidence that may be probative 
because other values are more important than finding truth in litigation”). 
 275. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (allowing courts to issue a protective 
order “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, 
or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified 
way”). 
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important but is simultaneously more value-neutral and more 
homogenous on value questions than the privilege rules.276  
For instance, the spousal privilege reflects the judgment that 
marriage is a good that the government should promote.277 The 
clerical privilege recognizes that candor between priest and 
parishioner, and the spiritual enlightenment that might follow, is 
good for society.278  
As one might expect, the disagreements about the value 
judgments underlying privileges have produced substantial 
disparity in privilege law. Some jurisdictions recognize the 
physician–patient privilege while others do not.279 Even when 
lawmakers in different jurisdictions agree about the existence of 
a privilege, the contours of its applicability may vary 
dramatically.280 Adding to the complexity in the area, privileges 
are largely the province of state law in civil cases, even in federal 
courts.281 The fifty states have come to widely varying conclusions 
on privilege questions, an unsurprising result that reflects the 
political and moral diversity of the country.  
                                                                                                     
 276. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences 
of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631, 662 (stating that privileges “lie at the center 
of the contemporary debate about the foundations of liberal society” and that 
“[t]o privilege certain relationships is to declare certain values”). 
 277. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958)  
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or 
husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a 
belief that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only 
for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the 
public as well. 
 278. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“The priest-
penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual 
counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts 
or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return.”). 
 279. Compare CAL. EVID. CODE § 994 (West 2008) (describing physician–
patient privilege), with United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(“This Court has . . . concluded that there is no doctor-patient privilege under 
federal law.”). 
 280. Compare TEX. R. EVID. 509 (applying the physician–patient privilege in 
civil, not criminal, cases), with CAL. EVID. CODE § 300, 994 (applying the 
physician–patient privilege in criminal and civil cases). 
 281. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (“But in a civil case, state law governs privilege 
regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.”). 
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But these value judgments are not implicated by protective-
order procedures. If a privilege applies and prevents disclosure in 
discovery, an audience-limiting protective order simply is not 
necessary. Indeed, if a privilege keeps information out of 
discovery, there is simply nothing to protect.  
On the other hand, if one state’s privilege law in a particular 
area (or lack thereof) allows disclosure of information that would 
be privileged in another state, and no court enters a protective 
order, the first state’s privilege law may thwart the second’s.282 
The same is true if a court in a state where information is not 
privileged allows discovery sharing with cases in states where 
privilege would limit disclosure. The information still would not 
reach the general public (because the collateral party presumably 
received the information by agreeing to the protective-order’s 
restrictions against further disclosure); but it would be available 
for litigation purposes, contrary to the receiving jurisdiction’s 
privilege law.283 
One response to this might be simply that the states often 
thwart one another’s policy judgments, an undeniable reality of a 
multi-sovereign republic. The disparity in privilege law, largely 
recognized as appropriately within the discretion of state 
lawmakers or courts, might be more the culprit here than the 
sharing order. Indeed, the court in the sharing jurisdiction was 
not obligated to enter a protective order at all.284 And if it had 
refused to grant any confidentiality, its previous privilege ruling 
would have, in itself, thwarted the policy of the receiving 
jurisdiction by allowing would-be privileged information to flow 
in. 
In this same way, Colorado’s policy legalizing marijuana 
thwarts the criminal justice policy of its neighbor states when 
                                                                                                     
 282. See 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 273, § 5.8 (delineating which 
state’s privilege laws apply). 
 283. The party holding the privilege may, of course, still contest the 
admissibility of the information at trial. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 10, at 496 
(“[S]haring is consistent with a settled doctrine exempting exchange of 
information between litigants with a common litigation opponent from the risk 
that the exchange will be deemed a waiver of privileges.”). 
 284. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (“Rule 
26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order 
is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”). 
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Colorado-grown pot flows across the border.285 Rather than 
serving as a reason to limit discovery sharing, tension among 
states’ privilege law may simply be an inevitable by-product of 
states’ recognized ability to make their own policy choices. 
Another version of the privilege problem comes up when 
sharing courts order parties to produce information pursuant to a 
qualified privilege.286 The trade-secret privilege provides an apt 
example. Many states qualify the trade secret privilege to allow 
courts to compel production of otherwise privileged information 
where failing to do so would “conceal fraud” or otherwise create 
“an injustice.”287 The burden is often placed on the party seeking 
the privileged information to establish that injustice or 
concealment of a fraud would occur absent disclosure in the 
case.288 
Some argue that when courts allow sharing in trade-secret 
cases without requiring such a showing, the protective-order 
ruling might actually conflict with the sharing jurisdiction’s own 
privilege law.289 Many states’ privileges not only allow the party 
holding the privilege to refuse to provide the information absent a 
showing of injustice or fraud, but also to prevent others from 
doing so.290 A sharing protective order in such a jurisdiction, 
                                                                                                     
 285. See, e.g., Jack Healy, After 5 Months of Sales, Colorado Sees the 
Downside of a Legal High, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1kjtwf8 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (highlighting that some law enforcement officials in 
neighboring states that have seen an increase in marijuana-related offenses) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 286. See Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011) (addressing the tension between sharing protective orders and 
state trade-secret privilege). 
 287. Id. 
 288. See, e.g., id. (stating that “sharing provisions, like the underlying one, 
which allow the dissemination of trade secrets without considering these factors 
codified” under Florida law “are per se unlawful”). 
 289. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.506 (West 1995) (attempting to 
circumvent the conflict between disclosure and privilege by directing courts to 
“take protective measures that the interests of the holder of the 
privilege . . . require” when directing disclosure of such holder’s trade secret). 
 290. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.506 (“A person has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose, and to prevent other persons from disclosing, a trade secret owned by 
that person if the allowance of the privilege will not conceal fraud or otherwise 
work injustice.”); see also, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 
(1984) (holding that a protective order “entered on a showing of good cause as 
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according to some, could potentially undermine the privilege in 
all future cases within the sharing provision after the first 
case.291  
But in the trade-secret-privilege context, these concerns 
conflate two separate issues and overstate the concern. First, the 
question of whether material is discoverable or not because of a 
privilege is distinct from concerns about limiting the proper 
audience for the material through protective orders.292 If a court 
orders a party to produce otherwise privileged information 
because failing to do so would be “an injustice,” and does not 
enter a protective order, the information could be disseminated to 
the general public.  
Of course, the inquiries inform one another. A court should 
consider the efficacy of protective measures when deciding to 
order production of trade secrets or other privileged 
information.293 Whether to enter such an order, however, is a 
Rule 26(c) question, subject to the trial court’s broad discretion, 
not a privilege question. This distinction means that Rule 26(c)’s 
good cause standard, not privilege law, governs the size of the 
audience for trade-secret information a court has deemed 
discoverable. 
Moreover, protective orders that account for similarity 
between the sharing case and receiving case adequately account 
for trade secret holders’ interests. Well-crafted sharing orders 
allow sharing only with factually similar litigation.294 Thus, the 
                                                                                                     
required by Rule 26(c), . . . limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, [that] 
does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other 
sources” does not violate the First Amendment); Moskowitz, supra note 67, 824–
25 (discussing the role of good cause in granting protective orders). 
 291. See Wal-Mart Stores, 81 So. 3d at 490 (“Sharing provisions, like the 
underlying one, which allow the dissemination of trade secrets without 
considering [the operation of the privilege] are per se unlawful.”). 
 292. Cf., e.g, Chapa v. Garcia, 848 S.W.2d 667, 673 n.8 (Tex. 1992) (Doggett, 
J., concurring) (“While discoverability by the parties is often confused with 
disclosability to the public, discoverability and disclosability issues must be 
resolved separately.”).  
 293. See In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. 1998) 
(holding that courts should enter appropriate protective order after determining 
whether to order production of trade secret information). 
 294. See, e.g., Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 885, 886 (Cal Ct. App. 1995) (providing an example of a protective order that 
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shared information is likely necessary and relevant in the 
receiving case, satisfying the “injustice” prong of the trade-secret 
privilege.295 If the discovery is relevant and necessary in one case 
involving a defective widget that injured a person it likely has a 
sufficient connection to another case involving the same widget 
that injured another person. 
In essence, if the court compels disclosure of trade-secret 
information and simultaneously grants a protective order that 
allows sharing with similar cases, it has implicitly ruled that the 
information is necessary for the proper preparation of all cases 
within the sharing class. 
To the extent the court has concerns about the relevance and 
necessity in cases receiving the information, it can address those 
concerns by narrowing the sharing class, not eliminating it 
entirely. An approach that allows appropriate sharing of trade-
secret information, pursuant to a thoughtful and well-crafted 
sharing order, is consistent with the qualified trade-secret 
privilege. 
Second, courts have long recognized that the trade-secret 
privilege is qualified rather than absolute.296 Indeed, prominent 
commentators have recognized that protection for trade secrets is 
not a “true” privilege because trade secrets are “generally 
discoverable where they are relevant to the dispute.”297 In many 
jurisdictions, the showings necessary to trigger compelled 
disclosure of trade secrets because of “injustice” boil down to 
something more than, but akin to, relevance.298 Courts take this 
                                                                                                     
allowed sharing of information “in other pending similar litigation”). 
 295. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.506 (stating that information may only fall 
within the trade-secret provision “if the allowance of the privilege will 
not . . . otherwise work an injustice”). 
 296. See, e.g., Bleacher v. Bristol-Myers Co., 163 A.2d 526, 529 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1960) (“Before a court will order a manufacturer to divulge information 
relating to a secret process or formula of his product, it must be clearly shown 
that the information required is relevant to the issue, not otherwise available 
and necessary in the proof of plaintiff’s case.”). 
 297. 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 274, § 5:49. 
 298. See, e.g., Bleacher, 163 A.2d at 529 (finding the plaintiff entitled to the 
trade secret information necessary to prove her case); see also 2 MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 274, § 5:49 (“The term ‘privilege’ appears in this 
setting, but there is no ‘true’ privilege simply because trade secrets and 
competitive information are generally discoverable where they are relevant to 
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lenient approach because the trade-secret privilege works in 
tandem with protective orders to keep information from 
competitors. 
The purpose of the privilege is to preserve the value of trade-
secret information by forbidding its disclosure to the privilege 
holder’s economic foes.299 Almost all sharing orders forbid 
dissemination to the disclosing party’s competitors. By doing so, 
the orders protect the value of the disclosing party’s secrets. It is 
well established that compelling the disclosure of trade secrets in 
litigation subject to a protective order that prevents competitors 
from accessing the information is appropriate.300 
B. Modification Standards  
To the extent courts use nonsharing protective orders, 
collateral litigants should be able to obtain easy access to 
discovery for use in related cases. Most courts to consider the 
issue take this liberal approach, championed by Wilk v. American 
Medical Association.301 Wilk’s presumption in favor of modifying 
                                                                                                     
the dispute.”). But see In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d at 613–14 
(rejecting the argument that mere relevance is enough to overcome qualified 
trade secret privilege); cf. 26 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 5651 (1st ed. 2010) (stating that the concept of “injustice” in the qualified 
trade-secret context “expanded in the caselaw to any situation in which the facts 
cannot be ascertained without disclosure of the trade secrets” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 299. See, e.g., In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003) (“[A] trade secret 
is any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in 
one’s business and presents an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it.” (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)). 
 300. See, e.g., Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 
U.S. 340, 362 n.24 (1979) (“Actually, orders forbidding any disclosure of trade 
secrets or confidential commercial information are rare. More commonly, the 
trial court will enter a protective order restricting disclosure to counsel. . . .”). 
 301. 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[W]here an appropriate 
modification of a protective order can place private litigants in a position they 
would otherwise reach only after repetition of another’s discovery, such 
modification can be denied only where it would tangibly prejudice substantial 
rights of the party opposing modification.”), superseded by rule as stated in Bond 
v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., Foltz v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Wilk with approval 
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protective orders to aid collateral litigation best supports Rule 1 
interests, as highlighted at the Duke Conference and in the 
proposed civil rules amendments.302 
Some courts, however, disagree and continue to impose an 
unduly high barrier to modifying protective orders.303 The 
primary justification for doing so is the supposed harm to parties 
that have produced information in reliance on the order.304 But 
reality belies this reasoning. First, many protective orders are 
stipulated umbrella orders, rubberstamped by a court.305 By their 
very terms, these orders allow any party to the case to challenge 
the “confidentiality” of a document.306 If a court sustains the 
challenge, the document is immediately stripped of protection. It 
is hard to envision how a party might view such an order as a 
guarantee of confidentiality and thereby rely on it.307 Any party 
producing putatively confidential documents under an umbrella 
                                                                                                     
and requiring something less than Martindell’s extraordinary circumstances 
test); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 790 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(rejecting extraordinary circumstances test as too strict); United Nuclear Corp. 
v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1990) (adopting the 
standard in Wilk); Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 775 N.W.2d 302, 309–10 (Iowa 
2009) (adopting the less stringent test from Wilk). 
 302. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 77 (amending Rule 1 to 
emphasize that the parties, as well as the courts, have the responsibility to 
“secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”).  
 303. See Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 
1979) (requiring “a showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c) 
protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need” to 
disclose information under the umbrella of a protective order). 
 304. See id. (rejecting a government attempt to modify a protective order 
where parties relied on the order in providing testimony that would otherwise 
be privileged under the 5th Amendment).  
 305. See Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery, 
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 357, 357 (2006) (“Disturbingly, some courts routinely sign 
orders which contain confidentiality clauses without considering the propriety of 
such orders, or the countervailing public interests which are sacrificed by the 
orders.” (citing Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785 (3d. Cir. 
1994))). 
 306. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 500–02 (describing, with approval, the 
operation of umbrella protective orders). 
 307. See id. at 502 (“Admittedly, the court may find the fact that an 
umbrella order has been used bears on reasonable reliance issues if modification 
of the order is sought. . . .”). 
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order is taking a leap of faith, not relying on a promise of future 
secrecy.  
Second, it is well known that courts frequently modify 
protective orders to allow third parties to use discovery 
information in similar collateral litigation, particularly in 
products-liability litigation.308 Indeed, many protective orders 
specifically indicate that the court retains jurisdiction to modify 
the order even after the primary litigation has ended. To the 
extent any party relies on an order expressly indicating it is 
subject to modification in a litigation system that frequently 
modifies orders for litigation-related use, such reliance is 
unreasonable.  
Even if a party relies on a protective order for confidentiality, 
any harm flowing from a modification to allow information to be 
used in related litigation is minimal or nonexistent in most cases. 
Only two sources of harm typically flow from sharing-related 
modifications. Neither justifies an onerous modification standard. 
First, a party that produced inculpatory information in the 
sharing case may be held accountable in a receiving case for the 
real-world misconduct the shared information reveals. While this 
is undoubtedly undesirable for the producing party, courts should 
not resist modifying protective orders to aid parties in escaping 
liability in subsequent cases.309 It is true that litigants sometimes 
escape liability as a by-product of the rules’ goals (e.g., when a 
rule precludes disclosure of a damning fact for the sake of 
minimizing discovery’s burdens or protecting another process), 
but minimizing liability for misconduct is not an appropriate use 
of the discovery rules.310 
Many courts have lauded discovery sharing’s capability to 
hold defendants accountable for varying discovery responses 
                                                                                                     
 308. See id. at 498 (acknowledging courts’ willingness to modify orders 
makes reliance less reasonable in many cases). 
 309. Cf. Dore, supra note 1, at 363 (arguing that protective orders should not 
be used to shield against liability). 
 310. See also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 
(1958) (discussing the great need for grand jury transcripts to be kept 
confidential); cf. Dore, supra note 1, at 363 (arguing that protective orders 
should not be used as shield against liability). 
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across different cases.311 Better holding defendants accountable 
for the real-world conduct that led to litigation seems to be an 
even more fundamental benefit of shared discovery. To the extent 
parties produce information in one case in reliance on a protective 
order to shield them from an inculpatory disclosure in a future 
case, their reliance is not detrimental in a sense that Rule 26 
should recognize.312 
A second harm Rule 26 might recognize is an increased risk 
of public disclosure, potentially undermining the competitive 
value of information.313 When a protective order is modified, the 
audience of litigants and attorneys widens. Each additional 
person who receives the information makes it slightly more likely 
that someone violates the order’s terms and disseminates the 
information to a broad, even public, audience.314 The potential for 
mass dissemination may arguably be more acute in the Internet 
age, when one rogue recipient could disseminate an entire 
discovery production to a global audience.315  
Nevertheless, experience has shown that the risk of such 
misconduct is minimal. During the more than forty years of the 
modern protective-order regime (including almost twenty years in 
                                                                                                     
 311. See In re Abbott Labs. Sec. Litig., No. 92 C 3869, 1993 WL 616693, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1993) (stating that discovery sharing “allows plaintiffs’ 
counsel to verify that they, in their respective cases, have in fact received all of 
the documentation they are entitled to”). 
 312. But see Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 295–96 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (finding that the district court erred in allowing the Government to 
obtain protected testimony because “a witness should be entitled to rely upon 
the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties” otherwise such 
witnesses would be “inhibited from giving essential testimony in civil 
litigation”). 
 313. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 824 (discussing the potential for “serious 
problems of policing and enforcement” of protective orders and noting that 
“[o]nce the information has been transferred beyond the limits of the jurisdiction 
where it was originally discovered, the court’s contempt power will no longer 
reach those in its possession”). 
 314. See id. (“[T]he likelihood of violation, inadvertent or otherwise, will 
increase in direct proportion to the number of disclosures.”). 
 315. See Marder, supra note 26, at 318 (observing that with the existence of 
the Internet “the reach of ‘public’ has expanded, and the consequences of any 
mistaken disclosure are far greater than when the ‘public’ meant an individual 
who went down to the courthouse . . . and then returned the document” after 
reading it). 
PROPORTIONALITY, PRETRIAL CONFIDENTIALITY 2245 
the Internet age), notable protective order violations are 
relatively rare.316 The relatively low number of serious violations 
likely stems from the serious consequences imposed on attorneys 
who violate orders. Contempt is one possible sanction.317 A less 
recognized informal punishment, but one that may serve as a 
serious deterrent, is the likely use of an attorney’s protective-
order violation as evidence in other courts to prevent that same 
attorney, or expert, from obtaining access to discovery in future 
cases.318 This informal sanction could undermine a protective-
order violator’s livelihood. 
Moreover, harm flowing from reliance on an order modified 
to allow yet-to-occur future violations is speculative.319 When 
courts assess the detriments of a modification, they should focus 
on actual or likely harm, not low-level possibilities.320 Protective-
order violations are rare, but unauthorized disclosure to a 
competitor of a producing party as the result of a protective-order 
modification is almost unheard of.  
                                                                                                     
 316. Some violations have occurred over the years, but courts have displayed 
robust willingness to enforce their orders. Relative to the tens of thousands of 
protective orders issued during the Rule 26(c) era, the number of violations 
remains small. But see Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 
F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding sanctions for inadvertent violation 
when attorneys had unintentionally disseminated materials via a CD provided 
to a plaintiffs’ conference audience); McDonald v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 186 
F. App’x 930, 932 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding violation of protective order); Nevil v. 
Ford Motor Co., No. CV 294-015, 1999 WL 1338625, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 
1999) (finding expert in contempt when expert disclosed information about 
protected documents in collateral litigation). 
 317. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 50, at 348 (noting that “contempt of court” 
is a potential punishment for violating a protective order). 
 318. Defendants are not shy about using past protective-order violations 
against the violator to urge courts not to grant access to information. See 
Defendant Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel & in Support of Cooper’s Motion for a Protective 
Order at 45, Richards v. Ford Motor Co., No. 310958/2011, 2013 WL 6096311 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011) (emphasizing that the “[p]laintiffs’ retained tire 
expert, Dennis Carlson, has been sanctioned previously” for violating a 
protective order). 
 319. See, e.g., Timmins, supra note 92, at 1523 (noting that courts have held 
that risk of harm through future disclosure is “entirely speculative”). 
 320. See, e.g., Parsons v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 
1980). 
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Beyond the harm accruing to a particular litigant from 
relying on a later-modified protective order, some courts have 
considered negative impacts on the system that might flow from 
modifying an order. That was the scenario in Martindell, where 
the Second Circuit required extraordinary circumstances to 
modify an order to allow civil discovery to be used in a criminal 
prosecution.321 Several witnesses relied on the protective order at 
issue when deciding not to exercise their Fifth Amendment right 
not to testify at a deposition.322  
The court understandably worried that modifying the order 
would deter future litigants in the same situation from 
cooperating in civil discovery, particularly when criminal liability 
loomed in the background.323 This reasoning doubtless has 
common sense appeal—knowing that a protective order might be 
modified to accommodate prosecutors would cause most people to 
refuse to testify by invoking the Fifth.  
The gap in the court’s reasoning, however, is twofold. First, it 
is less than clear that future witnesses would know about the 
previous protective order modification. Second, most cases do not 
involve discovery that has a dual-purpose use as both civil 
discovery and high-stakes criminal evidence, making the specter 
of widespread discovery resistance unlikely in regular 
circumstances.324 In the absence of empirical evidence to the 
contrary, it seems unreasonable to assume that parties engaged 
in ordinary civil litigation will resist discovery to a greater extent 
than they would have anyway because of a possible protective-
order modification. 
                                                                                                     
 321. See Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 
1979) (discussing the reasons the “information in question” was not found to be 
confidential). 
 322. See id. at 295–96. 
 323. See id. (“In short, witnesses might be expected frequently to refuse to 
testify pursuant to protective orders if their testimony were to be made 
available to the Government for criminal investigatory purposes in disregard of 
those orders.”). 
 324. Cf. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 
1987) (finding that, in contrast to the deponents in Martindell, the proponents of 
continued protection in this case “could not have relied on the permanence of the 
protective order”), superseded by statute as stated in Iridium India Telecom Ltd. 
v. Motorola, Inc., 165 F. App’x 878 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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The Wilk court appropriately created a presumption in favor 
of modifying protective orders to give collateral litigants access to 
discovery in the absence of substantial prejudice to the party 
opposed to the modification.325 This modification-friendly 
approach considers the same interests as the Martindell court but 
accords them different importance.326  
Instead of presuming the harm done to parties who allegedly 
rely on later-modified protective orders, the Wilk court requires a 
party resisting sharing via a modification to demonstrate actual 
harm from reliance or other prejudice.327 At the same time, the 
Wilk test accords proper weight to the benefits of shared 
discovery by placing a thumb on that end of the scale. This proof-
based approach to reliance reasonably balances the interests at 
stake. 
A liberal modification regime also complements the current 
proposed amendments to the civil rules. When litigants in 
collateral cases modify a protective order and receive discovery 
under the modification, the discovery process is aided in 
collateral courts. Litigants receiving shared discovery information 
are in a better position to understand the benefits of potential 
discovery requests and to tailor them accordingly.328 Like any 
                                                                                                     
 325. See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299–1300 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(explaining that the presumption for public access to pretrial discovery “should 
operate with all the more force when litigants . . . use discovery in aid of 
collateral litigation on similar issues” because “access in such cases materially 
eases the tasks of courts . . . and speeds up . . . a lengthy process”), superseded 
by rule as stated in Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 326. See State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Manners, 239 S.W.3d 583, 587–88 
(Mo. 2007). The Manners court has recognized a third strand, in addition to the 
Martindell and Wilk tests, in the modification standard fight. See id. (“Arguably, 
the standards recognize the same controlling criteria and differ only in the 
weight that should be given to the criteria in their balancing.”). 
 327. See Wilk, 635 F.2d at 1301 (concluding that due to the “close similarity” 
between the actions the “State is presumptively entitled to access to all of the 
Wilk discovery on the same terms as the Wilk plaintiff”). 
 328. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (“[T]he burden or expense of the 
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the 
case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving 
the issues.”); see also COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 80 (showing 
committee’s suggested amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 regarding 
proportionality in discovery). 
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form of discovery sharing, sharing through protective-order 
modifications has the potential to reduce oft-repeating discovery 
litigation in repeating cases. 
C. Proportionality and Sharing 
Although sharing does work in tandem with proportionality 
to streamline discovery, the relationship has its limits. For 
instance, shared discovery does not provide an independent 
ground for courts and litigants to employ the proportionality 
concept to limit discovery in most instances. At first glance, 
shared discovery from a previous or contemporaneous case might 
potentially be a “more convenient, less burdensome” source of 
information.329 Moreover, shared discovery from another case 
might reduce the “importance of the discovery in resolving the 
issues.”330 Shared discovery in the possession of a requesting 
party almost certainly does not preclude similar discovery in the 
party’s own case based on these provisions in their current or 
amended form. 
Despite the intuitive appeal of the argument, no 
commentators and few courts have directly addressed the 
question. Courts have, however, regularly addressed the closely 
related question of whether litigants may request information 
from another party when the requestor already has the 
information in her possession.331 And they have routinely allowed 
such discovery.332 
For example, courts should seldom disallow the deposition of 
a witness in a case just because that witness has previously been 
deposed in another case, even though that deposition has been 
shared.333 The re-deposition of the witness should be allowed 
                                                                                                     
 329. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). 
 330. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 331. See, e.g., Wilson Land Corp. v. Smith Barney, Inc., 48 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 
1297, 1302 (E.D.N.C. 2000) (“The mere fact that the matters regarding which 
discovery is sought happen to be within the knowledge of the moving party is 
not usually grounds for objection . . . .”). 
 332. Id.; Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624, 625 (S.D. Fla. 
1977). 
 333. Cf. Hoh Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 87-0274 RCL, 1991 WL 
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because, particularly with party witnesses, litigants in the 
current case are entitled to know that the party’s contentions at 
deposition are based on current information for the current 
case.334 Indeed, discovery is not limited to just an investigation of 
facts; another important purpose of discovery is to ascertain the 
parties’ contentions about the facts, claims, and defenses.335 Over 
time, parties can subtly shift their positions or give a different 
version of the facts. Memories change.  
Different advocates advancing different claims ask different 
questions. Forcing litigants to rely on potentially outdated 
depositions to ascertain the current case’s factual and legal 
posture would undermine the quality of fact finding at trial. 
Thus, there is substantial necessity for the deposition in the 
second case, and even though there is substantial subject-matter 
overlap, the deposition is not, in any way that is cognizable by 
Rule 26, “duplicative” or “cumulative” or even “available” from a 
less costly source. 
The same logic should also apply when the form of discovery 
is dependent on written questions and a potentially variable 
party response.336 Over time, circumstances, along with claims 
and defenses, change. Litigants should have the benefit of their 
own questions and the responses that flow from them. Requests 
for admissions provide an apt example. Asking someone to admit 
a fact or position presumes that the person asking has some 
previous knowledge on which to base the question.337 Even if that 
                                                                                                     
229948, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 1991) (holding re-deposition allowed in light of 
changed legal circumstances after remand). 
 334. See id. (stating that the proposition that a court may not “‘prohibit the 
taking of a deposition altogether . . . absent extraordinary circumstances’” 
applies “even when the party seeking discovery wishes to take a second 
deposition of the same individual”). 
 335. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 2014 (observing that the rule 
prohibiting discovery of matters within knowledge of requesting party “could 
hardly apply to discovery under the federal rules, since the purpose of the 
discovery rules is not only to elicit unknown facts, but also to narrow and define 
the issues”). 
 336. See, e.g., United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, 66 F.R.D. 570, 573 (E.D. 
Ill. 1975) (holding that interrogatories are proper even when inquiring party 
already has knowledge). 
 337. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 2014 (“[T]he very existence of a 
request–for–admission procedure, which often implies some knowledge on the 
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knowledge flows from shared discovery, courts should not 
preclude discovery as disproportionate. 
Proportionality may, however, provide a mechanism to 
preclude re-discovery of information in some very limited 
circumstances. For instance, courts may decide that identical 
requests, including requests to which responses would not change 
from case to case, are “duplicative” or “cumulative” or simply not 
necessary in light of the burden of producing information that 
overlaps with already shared discovery.338 But this is a principle 
of limited applicability.  
Seldom will requests or responses be identical, or virtually 
so, even in similar cases. The facts of each case, and the parties’ 
contentions and shading of the facts in each case, will almost 
necessarily vary. The particular benefits of discovery for the 
current case must, in most cases, be weighed anew against the 
burdens of production despite the existence of shared responses 
from a previous case.339 Thus, while sharing supports 
proportionality through the better exercise of attorney discretion, 
the practice is not an independent ground to limit discovery 
under the current or amended proportionality rules. 
Instead of providing a basis to forbid discovery, sharing 
allows litigants to more carefully and thoughtfully employ 
proportional discovery requests. Instead of searching in the dark 
with unfocused discovery requests, attorneys can target 
particularly beneficial information based on their knowledge of 
other discovery productions in similar cases. This increased 
accuracy reduces both the volume of discovery requests and 
potential litigation about those requests stemming from well-
founded or unfounded objections. In many instances, faced with 
                                                                                                     
part of the requesting party of the matters covered by the requests for 
admissions, shows that knowledge is no bar to use of the tools authorized by 
Rules 26 to 36.”). 
 338. 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 136, ¶ 26.41[13] (“A court will nevertheless 
limit discovery of matters known to the discovering party when the discovery 
appears to serve no purpose . . . .”). 
 339. See Wiwa v. Shell Petrol. Dev. Co. of Nigeria Ltd., 335 F. App’x 81, 84 
(2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court committed clear error by granting 
a Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) request to limit discovery because of availability of 
discovery in related cases when previous discovery was inadequate to address 
issues in present case). 
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the choice between drafting requests for information already in 
their possession (and potentially litigating objections to those 
requests), litigants may well exercise their discretion to rely on 
shared information. 
V. Conclusion 
Many courts have long recognized the benefits of discovery 
sharing, despite the fact that over thirty years of procedural 
reform aimed at improving discovery have ignored it. Partially as 
a result of this inattention, courts remain divided in their 
approach to the issue. Litigants and the court system suffer as a 
result. Preferring upfront sharing provisions and making later 
modifications easier would be steps consistent with the spirit and 
letter of current procedural reform. On balance, sharing makes 
courts more efficient, more transparent, and more effective at 
finding the truth. Courts operating within the discretion afforded 
by Rule 26(c), and similar state rules, should exercise their power 
to reap these benefits. 
